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Chapter 1
Structural change and the
Kaldor facts in a growth model
with relative price effects and
non-Gorman preferences
Chapter Summary
Growth is associated with (i) shifts in the sectoral structure of the econ-
omy, (ii) changes in relative prices and (iii) the Kaldor facts. Moreover, (iv)
cross-sectional data shows systematic differences in the expenditure struc-
ture. This paper presents a growth model which is consistent with (i)-(iv) at
the same time, a result the existing literature has not been able to generate.
The theory is simple and parsimonious and contains an analytical solution.
The model’s functional form and the cross-sectional data are exploited to
estimate the relative importance of price and income effects as determinants
of the structural change.
AND THE KALDOR FACTS
1.1 Introduction
It is a well documented empirical fact that economic growth is associated
with significant shifts in the sectoral output, employment and consumption
structure (see e.g. Kuznets, 1957 and Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie, 2001).
This phenomenon is summarized under the term “structural change”. As an
example, Figure 1.1 shows the relative decline of the goods sector (or the rise
of the service sector) in the U.S. after World War II. On a logarithmic scale
the evolution of the expenditure share devoted to goods is well approximated
by a linear downward sloping trend (see dashed line). The slope of this
linear fit suggests that the expenditure share devoted to goods decreases (on
average) at a constant annualized rate of one percent.
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Figure 1.1: Expenditure share of goods
Notes: The figure plots the share of personal consumption expenditures devoted to goods in the U.S. on a logarithmic
scale. The dashed line represents the predicted values obtained by regressing the logarithmized expenditure share on
time and a constant. The estimated slope coefficient and its standard error is −0.0102 and 0.00015, respectively. The
regression attains an R2 of 0.986. Source: BEA, NIPA table 1.1.5.
The nonbalanced nature of growth is displayed in prices too. Figure 1.2
plots the evolution of the relative consumer price between goods and services
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on a logarithmic scale. Apart from the two oil crises in 1973 and 1979, the
series is fairly good approximated by a constant annualized growth rate of
-1.6 percent (see dashed line).
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Figure 1.2: Relative price between goods and services
Notes: The figure plots the relative consumer price between goods and services on a logarithmic scale. The dashed
line represents the predicted values obtained by regressing the logarithmized relative price on a constant and time. The
estimated slope coefficient and its standard error is −0.0162 and 0.00037, respectively. The regression attains an R2
of 0.968. Source: BEA, NIPA table 1.1.4.
Beyond the nonbalanced characteristics at the sectoral level, aggregate
variables present a balanced picture of growth. Actually, the post-war U.S.
often serves as a prime example of balanced growth on the aggregate. Bal-
anced growth is best summarized by the Kaldor facts. These stylized facts
state that the growth rate of real per-capita output, the real interest rate,
the capital-output ratio and the labor income share are constant over time
(see Kaldor, 1961). As a consequence, comprehensive models of structural
change should also replicate the Kaldor facts.
The paper by Ngai and Pissarides (2007) reconciles structural change,
relative price dynamics and the Kaldor facts in a growth model with endoge-
nous savings. Another paper that emphasizes relative price dynamics as a
8
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driver of structural change is the one by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).1
Both theoretical models – Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Acemoglu and
Guerrieri (2008) – feature a constant elasticity of substitution across sectors.
However, the relative nominal expenditures of goods declined in the U.S. at a
faster rate than the relative price of goods. Hence, with relative price effects
alone, theories with a constant elasticity of substitution cannot replicate the
observed structural change quantitatively.2
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) emphasize that income effects are an “un-
doubtly important” determinant of structural change. Nevertheless, both
Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) abstract from
non-homotheticity of preferences.3 Empirically, there is clear evidence for an
income effect. Figure 1.3 plots the expenditure shares devoted to goods for
the different income quintiles. Rich households exhibit a significantly lower
expenditure share of goods then poor households. Moreover, on a logarithmic
scale, the expenditure shares in Figure 1.3 are parallel and decline linearly.
This suggests that expenditure shares devoted to goods of rich and poor
households decline at the same (constant) growth rate as the aggregate se-
ries. With non-unitary expenditure elasticities of demand, increases in real
per-capita expenditure levels (due to growth) affect the sectoral expenditure
shares.4 Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001) and Foellmi and Zweimueller
(2008) reconcile non-homothetic preferences and the Kaldor facts in an oth-
erwise standard growth models with intertemporal optimization. However,
in order to obtain balanced aggregate growth, both theories have to exclude
relative price effects.5 Hence, as pointed out by Buera and Kaboski (2009a),
none of the existing models with endogenous savings and balanced aggregate
growth, allows us to discuss both forces of structural change - relative price
and income effects.
The contributions of this paper are as follows: First, it presents a neo-
classical growth theory with intertemporal optimization, which reconciles the
Kaldor facts with structural change simultaneously determined by relative
price and income effects. By postulating non-Gorman preferences the paper
9
CH. 1: STRUCTURAL CHANGE
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
19951987 20051990 2000 2010
1. quintile 2. quintile
3. quintile 4. quintile
5. quintile
Figure 1.3: Cross-sectional variation in expenditure structure
Notes: The figure plots the expenditure share devoted to goods for each income quintile of the U.S. on a logarithmic
scale. The following expenditure categories are considered as services: food away from home; shelter; utilities, fuels, and
public services; other vehicle expenses; public transportation; health care; personal care; education; cash contributions;
personal insurance and pensions. The remaining categories are considered as goods. The sample consists of expenditure
data of 450,602 quarters (and 165,887 households). Observations with missing income reports, with non-positive food
expenditures or with an expenditure share of goods outside [0, 1] have been excluded. The quintiles refer to total
household after tax labor earnings plus transfers per OECD-modified equivalence scale. If we observe for a household
more than one income report, the income data of the year in which the expenditure quarter lies is taken. Source:
Consumer Expenditure Survey.
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also illustrates a tractable (dynamic) framework which allows for effects of
inequality on the aggregate demand structure. Second, the paper illustrates
that the theory can replicate the shape and magnitude of structural change
and relative price dynamic identified in Figure 1.1 and 1.2. Moreover, the
model is consistent with cross-sectional expenditure structure differences and
the parallel evolution of logarithmized expenditure shares of different income
groups, depicted in Figure 1.3. Finally, a structural estimation allows us to
decompose the structural change into an income and substitution effect.6
The paper consists of four sections: Section 1.2 presents the theoretical
growth model. In section 1.3 an estimation of the relative importance of
income and substitution effects as determinants of structural change is carried
out. Finally, section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical model
There is a unit interval of (heterogeneous) households indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
Each household consists of N(t) identical members, where N(t) grows at an
exogenous rate n ≥ 0. N(0) is normalized to one, so we have N(t) = exp[nt].
Each member of household i is endowed with li ∈ (l¯,∞), l¯ > 0, units of
labor and ai(0) ∈ [0,∞) units of initial wealth. These per-capita factor
endowments can differ across households. Labor is supplied inelastically at
every instant of time. Consequently, the aggregate labor supply L(t) ≡
N(t)
∫ 1
0
li di, grows at constant rate n.
1.2.1 Preferences
All households have the following additively separable representation of in-
tertemporal preferences
Ui(0) =
∫ ∞
0
exp [−(ρ− n)t]V (P1(t), P2(t), ei(t)) dt, (1.1)
11
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where ρ ∈ (n,∞) is the rate of time preference and V (P1(t), P2(t), ei(t)) is
an indirect instantaneous utility function of each household member. This
instantaneous utility function is specified over the prices of the two consump-
tion goods, P1(t) and P2(t), and the nominal per-capita expenditure level of
household i, ei(t). Henceforth, the first consumption good is called “good”,
whereas the second consumption good is “service”. The indirect instanta-
neous utility function takes the following form
V (P1(t), P2(t), ei(t)) =
1
ǫ
[
ei(t)
P2(t)
]ǫ
−
β
γ
[
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ
−
1
ǫ
+
β
γ
, (1.2)
where 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ γ < 1 and β, γ > 0.7 It will be shown below that these
preferences imply a household behavior which is consistent with the facts
emphasized in the introduction.8 The specified intratemporal utility func-
tion represents a subclass of “price independent generalized linearity” (PIGL)
preferences defined by Muellbauer (1975) and Muellbauer (1976). The PIGL
class of preferences is more general than the Gorman class. Nevertheless,
PIGL preferences avoid an aggregation problem. Expenditure shares of the
aggregate economy coincide with those of a household with a “representa-
tive” expenditure level (the representative household in Muellbauer’s sense).
Moreover, PIGL preferences ensure that this representative expenditure level
is independent of prices. Because Engel curves are patently non-linear, PIGL
preferences have explicitly an empirical justification and are widely used in
expenditure system estimations (see e.g. the “Quadratic Expenditure Sys-
tem” (QES) by Howe, Pollak and Wales, 1979 or the “Almost Ideal Demand
System” (AIDS) by Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).
Lemma 1.1 shows that function (1.2) satisfies the standard properties of a
utility function.
LEMMA 1.1. Function (1.2),
(i) is a valid indirect utility specification that represents a preference rela-
12
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tion defined over goods and services if and only if
ei(t)
ǫ ≥
[
1− ǫ
1− γ
]
βP1(t)
γP2(t)
ǫ−γ, (1.3)
(ii) is increasing and strictly concave in ei(t).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1. Q.E.D.
Henceforth, I assume that condition (1.3) is fulfilled. Later, two con-
ditions in terms of exogenous parameters are stated, which jointly ensure
condition (1.3) for all individuals, at each date. Strict concavity of the in-
tratemporal utility function is a necessary condition for intertemporal opti-
mization, which will be addressed below.
The characteristics of the intratemporal preferences are best discussed in
terms of the associated expenditure system. Applying Roy’s identity, we get
the following lemma.
LEMMA 1.2. At each point in time, intratemporal preferences imply the
following expenditure system
xi1(t) = β
ei(t)
P1(t)
[
P2(t)
ei(t)
]ǫ [
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ
, (1.4)
and
xi2(t) =
ei(t)
P2(t)
[
1− β
[
P2(t)
ei(t)
]ǫ [
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ]
, (1.5)
where xij(t), j = 1, 2, is household i’s per-capita consumption of goods/services
at date t.
The expenditure system reveals, that the demand for goods, xi1(t), is an
exponential function of order 1− ǫ of the per-capita expenditure level. The
expenditure shares devoted to the two consumption sectors, sij(t); j = 1, 2,
can be expressed as
si1(t) = β
[
P2(t)
ei(t)
]ǫ [
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ
and si2(t) = 1− β
[
P2(t)
ei(t)
]ǫ [
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ
. (1.6)
13
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Figure 1.4: Engel curves
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Figure 1.5: Expenditure shares
Notes: As indicated by the dashed sections, preferences are only well defined, if condition (1.3) holds (i.e. ei(t) exceeds
a certain threshold).
For ǫ > 0, Figure 1.4 and 1.5 plot the Engel curves and the sectoral expen-
diture shares as a function of the per-capita expenditure level. In general, as
the non-linear Engel curves reveal, preferences are non-homothetic and even
do not fall into the Gorman class.
The elasticity of substitution across sectors and the expenditure elastici-
ties of demand control the magnitude and direction of the income and sub-
stitution effects on expenditure shares. Growing real per-capita expenditure
levels generate – according to the income effect – an increasing expenditure
share of the sector, whose expenditure elasticity of demand exceeds unity.
Besides, the substitution effect implies that if the elasticity of substitution is
strictly less than unity the sector which experiences a relative price increase,
gains in terms of expenditure shares. If the elasticity of substitution is larger
then one, the structural change would run in the opposite direction. The
next lemma characterizes the two important elasticities.
LEMMA 1.3. The intratemporal preferences, (1.2), imply that
14
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(i) the elasticity of substitution between goods and services,
σi(t) = 1− γ −
β
[
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ
[
ei(·)
P2(t)
]ǫ
− β
[
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ [γ − ǫ] , (1.7)
is strictly less than unity (for all households at each date).
(ii) with ǫ > 0, the expenditure elasticity of demand is positive, but strictly
smaller than one for goods and larger than one for services.
(iii) with ǫ = 0 we have homothetic preferences (expenditure elasticities of
both sectors are equal to unity).
Proof. The Allen-Uzawa formula for the elasticity of substitution reads σi(t) =
∂x
i,H
1 (t)
∂P2(t)
ei(t)
x
i,H
1 (t)x
i,H
2 (t)
, where xi,Hj (t) is the Hicksian per-capita demand of house-
hold i for sector j = 1, 2. Plugging in the expressions for the Hicksian
demand, simplifying and substituting Vi(t) by (1.2), we obtain (1.7). With
γ > 0 and (1.3), σi(t) is strictly smaller than one since γ ≥ ǫ. This completes
part (i). Part (ii) and (iii) follow immediately from (1.4) and (1.5). Q.E.D.
Several things are worth noting: First, the restrictions on the preference
parameters ǫ and γ are such that the elasticity of substitution is strictly less
than unity. In the literature there seems to be a consensus that this is the
empirically relevant case.9 This notion is also confirmed in section 1.3.
Second, in general, the elasticity of substitution varies over time and
across households. Nevertheless, there is a special case with γ = ǫ, in which
the elasticity of substitution is constant for all households at each date.
Third, with ǫ = 0, we have homothetic preferences and consequently no
income effect on expenditure shares. In contrast, as long as ǫ > 0, goods
are necessities with an expenditure elasticity of demand strictly smaller than
one.10
Next, we turn to the household’s intertemporal optimization problem.
Households maximize (1.1) with respect to {ei(t), ai(t)}
∞
t=0, subject to the
15
CH. 1: STRUCTURAL CHANGE
budget constraint
a˙i(t) = [r(t)− n] ai(t) + w(t)li − ei(t), (1.8)
and a standard transversality condition, which can be expressed as
lim
t→∞
ei(t)
ǫ−1P2(t)
−ǫai(t) exp [−(ρ− n)t] = 0. (1.9)
r(t) and w(t) is the (nominal) interest and wage rate, respectively, and ai(t)
denotes the per-capita wealth of household i at date t. ai(0) is exogenously
given. The result of intertemporal household optimization is summarized in
the next lemma.
LEMMA 1.4. Intertemporal optimization yields the Euler equation
(1− ǫ)gei(t) + ǫgP2(t) = r(t)− ρ, (1.10)
where gei(t) is the growth rate of per-capita consumption expenditures of
household i and gP2(t) is the growth rate of the price of services at date
t.
Proof. The current value Hamiltonian of the household’s intertemporal opti-
mization is given byH = V (·)+λi(t) [ai(t) [r(t)− n] + w(t)li − ei(t)] .We can
then derive the first-order conditions λ˙i(t) = λi(t) [ρ− r(t)] and ei(t)
ǫ−1P2(t)
−ǫ =
λi(t), which can be rewritten as (1.10). Q.E.D.
The Euler equation takes the same functional form as in the standard
neoclassical growth model with CRRA preferences. Additionally, since gei(t)
is the only term that involves a household index i, the Euler equation implies
that the growth rate of the per-capita expenditure levels is the same for all
households at a given point in time, or formally,
gei(t) = ge(t), ∀i. (1.11)
16
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Together with the desirable aggregation properties specific to all PIGL pref-
erences, the feature that all expenditure levels grow pari passu, simplifies the
equilibrium analysis dramatically. Let us define E(t) as the aggregate con-
sumption expenditures and Xj(t) as the aggregate demand for consumption
j = 1, 2 at date t (i.e. E(t) ≡ N(t)
∫ 1
0
ei(t)di and Xj(t) ≡ N(t)
∫ 1
0
xij(t)di,
j = 1, 2). Then, household behavior is summarized by the following propo-
sition.
PROPOSITION 1.1. Under consumer optimization,
(i) the intertemporal behavior of the demand side is fully characterized
by the following Euler equation, budget constraints and transversality
conditions:
(1− ǫ) [gE(t)− n] + ǫgP2(t) = r(t)− ρ, ∀t, (1.12)
where gE(t) is the growth rate of E(t),
a˙i(t) = [r(t)− n] ai(t) + w(t)li − ei(0) exp
[∫ t
0
gE(ς)− n dς
]
, ∀i, t,
(1.13)
and
lim
t→∞
ai(t) exp
[
−
∫ t
0
r(ς)− n dς
]
= 0, ∀i, (1.14)
where ai(0), ∀i, is exogenously given.
(ii) the aggregate expenditure share devoted to goods, S1(t) ≡
P1(t)X1(t)
E(t)
, is
given by
S1(t) = β
[
P2(t)
E(t)
N(t)
]ǫ [
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ
φ, (1.15)
where φ ≡
∫ 1
0
[
ei(0)N(0)
E(0)
]1−ǫ
di is a scale invariant (inverse) measure-
ment of inequality of per-capita consumption expenditures across house-
holds. Furthermore, we have
E(t) = P1(t)X1(t) + P2(t)X2(t). (1.16)
17
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(iii) a household with ei(t) =
E(t)
N(t)
φ−
1
ǫ ≡ eRA(t) is the representative agent
in Muellbauer’s sense.11
Proof. (1.11) implies gei(t) = gE(t) − n, ∀i, allowing us to rewrite (1.10) as
(1.12). Substituting ei(t) in (1.8) by ei(0) exp
[∫ t
0
gE(ς)− n dς
]
yields (1.13).
Using (1.10) in (1.9) and ignoring the positive constant ei(0) gives (1.14).
Aggregation of individual demands gives
X1(t) = βP1(t)
−1P2(t)
ǫ
[
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ [
E(t)
N(t)
]−ǫ
E(t)φ(t),
X2(t) =
E(t)
P2(t)
− βP2(t)
ǫ−1
[
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ [
E(t)
N(t)
]−ǫ
E(t)φ(t),
where φ(t) =
∫ 1
0
[
ei(t)N(t)
E(t)
]1−ǫ
di. These two equations imply (1.15) and
(1.16), where φ(t) is constant over time because of (1.11) and because it
is scale invariant in all ei(t). For part (iii): (1.6) and (1.15) show that a
household exhibits the same expenditure shares as the aggregate economy if
ei(t) =
E(t)
N(t)
φ−
1
ǫ . Q.E.D.
This proposition fully characterizes the demand side of this economy.
Given a path of production factor, good and service prices, {r(t), w(t), P1(t), P2(t)}
∞
t=0,
equations (1.12)-(1.16) define the equilibrium evolution of the level and struc-
ture of aggregate consumption expenditures. Since in general, the intratem-
poral preferences do not fall into the Gorman class, a representative agent in
the narrower sense does not apply and the distribution of per-capita expendi-
ture levels matters. Nevertheless, the tractability of the specified preferences
allows us to write the aggregate demand of goods and services as a function
of just two terms: the aggregate expenditure level, E(t), and a summary
statistic of the distribution of per-capita expenditure levels at date t = 0,
denoted by φ. This is the outcome of two special properties:
First, the fact that preferences are part of the “generalized linearity” class,
allows for a representative agent in Muellbauer’s sense (see Muellbauer, 1975
and Muellbauer, 1976). A household with the representative expenditure
18
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level, eRA(t), exhibits the same expenditure shares as the aggregate economy.
Moreover, since preferences are even part of the PIGL class, the representa-
tive expenditure level is independent of prices. Consequently, aggregate de-
mand can be expressed as a function of E(t) and the scale invariant inequality
measure of per-capita expenditure levels at date t, φ(t) =
∫ 1
0
[
ei(t)N(t)
E(t)
]1−ǫ
di.
The second property is that intertemporal optimization implies for all
households the same per-capita expenditure growth rate at any given point
in time (see (1.11)). Then, φ(t) is constant over time and can therefore be
expressed as a function of the ei(0) distribution.
12 This tractability allows me
to solve the model analytically, despite household heterogeneity, non-Gorman
intratemporal preferences and intertemporal optimization.13
φ can be related to an Atkinson index of expenditure inequality. To see
this, note that the Atkinson index (Atkinson, 1970) is defined as
IA
(
ζ, {ei(t)}
1
i=0
)
= 1−
N(t)
E(t)
[∫ 1
0
ei(t)
1−ζdi
] 1
1−ζ
,
with the parameter ζ ≥ 0 being the relative inequality aversion. Then, we
can write
φ(t) =
[
1− IA
(
ǫ, {ei(t)}
1
i=0
)]1−ǫ
,
i.e. φ is a negative, monotonic transformation of the Atkinson inequality
index with ζ = ǫ. Hence, φ is an ordinally equivalent of the inverse of an
Atkinson index. This justifies our interpretation of φ as an inverse mea-
surement of expenditure inequality fulfilling the principle of transfers, scale
invariance and decomposability (see Cowell, 2000).
To close the model, i.e. in order to determine the equilibrium path of pro-
duction factor, good and service prices, the production side of the economy
remains to be specified.
19
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1.2.2 Production
There are three output goods: the output of the two consumption sectors
Y1(t) and Y2(t) and an “investment good”, Y3(t), which can be transformed
one-to-one into capital, K(t). Capital depreciates at constant rate δ ≥ 0.
This implies for the law of motion of capital
K˙(t) = X3(t)− δK(t), (1.17)
where X3(t) is aggregate gross investment (in terms of investment goods) at
date t. The consumption sectors produce under perfect competition accord-
ing to the following technologies
Yj(t) = exp [gjt]Lj(t)
αKj(t)
1−α, j = 1, 2, (1.18)
where Lj(t) and Kj(t) denotes labor and capital, respectively, allocated to
sector j at date t. Both production factors are fully mobile across sectors.
α ∈ (0, 1) is the output elasticity of labor, which is identical across sectors.
Total factor productivity (TFP) expands at a constant, exogenous, sector-
specific rate gj ≥ 0.
14 The investment good is produced by a linear technology
Y3(t) = AK3(t), (1.19)
with A > δ. The market of investment goods is competitive, too. Henceforth,
I normalize the price of the investment good at each date to one, i.e. P3(t) =
1, ∀t. The production side of this economy is similar to the one in Rebelo
(1991).15 K(t) is a “core” capital good, whose production does not involve
nonreproducible factors. This makes endogenous growth feasible. But as
long as gj 6= 0, for some j = 1, 2, the economy also consists of an exogenous
driver of growth.
It is worthwhile to discuss shortly in which respects the functional forms
of the production functions can be generalized. First, the AK structure of
the investment good sector is not essential. It can be relaxed to any neoclas-
20
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sical production function with constant Harrod-neutral productivity growth,
i.e. Y3 = F (K3(t), exp [g3t]L3(t)). With this more general specification
transitional dynamics arise along which capital per effective labor, K(t)
exp[g3t]L(t)
,
adjusts. On the aggregate this transition is identical to the one in a standard
one-sector neoclassical growth model. And in the steady state the equilib-
rium looks as the one with the AK technology and the Kaldor facts hold. So
the AK technology allows us to focus more directly on the main dynamics:
the coexistence of structural change and balanced growth on the aggregate.
The production functions of the consumption sectors must ensure along
the equilibrium path the following two properties: (i) For the consumption
sectors, the overall labor income share must be constant and (ii) the relative
price between services and the investment good, P2(t)
P3(t)
, must change at a con-
stant rate. Requirement (i) is common to all structural change models aiming
to be consistent with the Kaldor facts. It is typically accommodated by a
constant and identical steady state labor income share in both sectors. This
can either be achieved by assuming that the production functions of sector 1
and 2 are – up to a time varying Hicks-neutral productivity term – identical
to the one of the investment good, i.e. Yj(t) = Aj(t)F (Kj(t), exp [g3t]Lj(t)),
j = 1, 2.16 Alternatively, the production technologies may differ from the
one of the investment good. But then we need, up to a time varying produc-
tivity term, Aj(t), identical Cobb-Douglas technologies in both consumption
sectors j = 1, 2. This is the specification chosen above (and also in Ngai
and Pissarides, 2007). Requirement (ii) is specific to this model and implies
that the time varying productivity term of the service sector must grow at a
constant rate, i.e. A2(t) = A2(0) exp [g2t].
17
Finally, it is worth noting that the entire model is specified in terms of
final output as opposed to value added. This means that in order to derive
theoretical implications for sectoral value added shares the exact produc-
tion processes with intermediate inputs have to be specified (see Herrendorf,
Rogerson and Valentinyi, 2009 for the empirical differences of these two per-
spectives). In this light the assumption of identical capital intensity of the
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good and service sector seems not unrealistic. Valentinyi and Herrendorf
(2008) estimate labor income shares for gross manufacturing output, gross
service output, overall consumption and total gross output that are all be-
tween 0.65 and 0.67. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, Appendix
A.3 illustrates the equilibrium dynamic with sectoral factor intensity differ-
ences.18
1.2.3 Equilibrium
Definition
In this economy, an equilibrium is defined as follows:
DEFINITION 1.1. A dynamic competitive equilibrium is a time path of
households’ per-capita expenditure levels, wealth stocks and consumption quan-
tities
{
ei(t), ai(t), x
i
j(t)
}∞
t=0
, j = 1, 2, ∀i; an evolution of prices, wage, inter-
est and rental rate, {Pj(t), w(t), r(t), R(t)}
∞
t=0, j = 1, 2 and a time path of fac-
tor allocations {L1(t), L2(t), K1(t), K2(t), K3(t)}
∞
t=0, which is consistent with
household and firm optimization, perfect competition, resource constraints
and market clearing conditions.
In the following I illustrate the equilibrium as the outcome of decentral-
ized markets. However, since all markets are complete and competitive the
Welfare Theorems apply and the dynamic competitive equilibrium coincides
with the solution to the social planner’s problem.
Resource constraints and market clearing conditions
In equilibrium, capital and labor markets have to clear, i.e.
L(t) = L1(t) + L2(t), and K(t) = K1(t) +K2(t) +K3(t), ∀t. (1.20)
Market clearing in the good, service and investment good markets requires
Yj(t) = Xj(t), j = 1, 2, 3, ∀t. (1.21)
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Since the price of the investment good is chosen as a nume´raire, asset market
clearing implies
N(t)
∫ 1
0
ai(t)di = K(t), ∀t. (1.22)
Finally, the market rate of return of capital has to equalize the rental rate
net of depreciations, i.e. r(t) = R(t)− δ, ∀t.
Equilibrium dynamic
Under the choice of nume´raire, perfect competition, resource constraints and
the market clearing conditions, the equilibrium in production is characterized
by the following lemma.
LEMMA 1.5. Firm optimization implies at each date t,
r(t) = A− δ, (1.23)
w(t) = A
α
1− α
K1(t) +K2(t)
L(t)
, j = 1, 2, (1.24)
Pj(t) = exp [−gjt]
[
A
1− α
] [
K1(t) +K2(t)
L(t)
]α
, j = 1, 2, (1.25)
Yj(t) = exp [gjt]
[
L(t)
K1(t) +K2(t)
]α
Kj(t), j = 1, 2, (1.26)
and
K1(t)
L1(t)
=
K2(t)
L2(t)
=
K1(t) +K2(t)
L(t)
. (1.27)
Proof. Optimization implies that the marginal rate of technical substitution
is equal to the relative factor price, i.e. w(t)
R(t)
= α
1−α
Kj(t)
Lj(t)
, j = 1, 2. With
R(t) = A and (1.20), this gives (1.23) and (1.27). Next, R(t) has to equalize
the valued marginal product across all sectors. This yields
R(t) = A = (1− α)
[
L(t)
K1(t) +K2(t)
]α
Pj(t) exp [gjt] , j = 1, 2,
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where (1.27) has been used. Solving for Pj(t) gives (1.25). Finally, with
(1.27), the production functions can be rewritten as (1.26). Q.E.D.
The dynamic competitive equilibrium is fully characterized by equations
(1.12)-(1.17) and (1.19)-(1.26). The endogenous variables are: Xj(t) and
Yj(t), j = 1, 2, 3; ai(t), ∀i; E(t), Pj(t), j = 1, 2; w(t), r(t), Lj(t), j = 1, 2;
K(t) and Kj(t), j = 1, 2, 3. ai(0), ∀i, is exogenously given.
When we solve for the dynamic competitive equilibrium, we obtain the
following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1.2. Suppose we have
A− δ − ρ+ ǫg2 > 0, (1.28)
ρ > (1− α)ǫ [A− δ] + n+ ǫg2, (1.29)
αǫl¯ǫ ≥
1− ǫ
1− γ
β
[
L(0)
K(0)
A (1− (1− α)ǫ)
ρ− n− ǫg2 − ǫ(1− α) (A− δ − n)
]ǫ(1−α)
, (1.30)
and
γ [g2 − g1]− ǫ
[
g2 + (1− α) [A− δ − ρ]
1− (1− α)ǫ
]
≤ 0. (1.31)
Then, there exists a unique dynamic competitive equilibrium path along which
(i) per-capita consumption expenditures, wages, aggregate capital and cap-
ital allocated to the consumption sectors grow at constant rates
g∗E − n = g
∗
w =
A− δ − ρ+ ǫg2
1− (1− α)ǫ
> 0, (1.32)
g∗K = g
∗
K1+K2
= g∗E. (1.33)
The saving rate is constant and the real, investment good denominated
interest rate is given by A− δ. The prices of goods and services change
at constant rates
g∗Pj = −gj + α [g
∗
E − n] , j = 1, 2. (1.34)
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(ii) the expenditure share devoted to goods changes at constant rate
g∗S1 = −γ [g1 − g2]− ǫ [g2 + (1− α) [g
∗
E − n]] ≤ 0. (1.35)
Capital and labor allocated to the goods sector grow at constant rates
g∗K1 = g
∗
K + g
∗
S1
≤ g∗K ≤ g
∗
K2
(t), and g∗L1 = n+ g
∗
S1
≤ n ≤ g∗L2(t), ∀t.
(1.36)
The relative price between consumption goods and services changes at
constant rate
g∗P1 − g
∗
P2
= g2 − g1. (1.37)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.2. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1.2 demonstrates that the model reconciles structural change
and changing relative prices at a sectoral level with balanced growth on the
aggregate. Let us first focus on part (i) which illustrates that the model fea-
tures on the aggregate the standard properties of neoclassical growth theory.
The per-capita growth rate is increasing in the marginal product of capi-
tal, A, and decreasing in the rate of time preference, ρ, and the depreciation
rate, δ. Furthermore, the Kaldor facts hold. Total labor income, w(t)L(t),
and the total capital income net of depreciation, rK(t), grow at the same
constant rate g∗E as aggregate output. Thus, the per-capita output growth
rate, the capital-output ratio, the saving rate and the labor income share are
constant. Moreover, the real, investment good denominated interest rate is
equal to A−δ. Since both consumption sector prices change at constant rates
(see (1.34)), any price index with constant sectoral weights grows at a con-
stant rate too. Hence, deflated by any price index with constant weights, the
real per-capita expenditure growth rate and real interest rate would be con-
stant. In an economy with structural change, however, the sectoral weights
of the true cost of living price index adjust over time. This would yield a
non-constant growth rate of the true cost of living price index. But typically,
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changes in the growth rate of the price index due to weight adjustments are
very small (see Ngai and Pissarides, 2004).19
The model exhibits no transitional dynamic and can be solved analyti-
cally.20 Without exogenous TFP growth (i.e. with g1 = g2 = 0), the ag-
gregate behavior would be the same as in Rebelo (1991). However, the in-
tertemporal substitution elasticity of expenditure, 1
1−ǫ
, is tied together with
the expenditure elasticity of demand for goods, ǫ.21
Noteworthy, although preferences are non-Gorman and inequality mat-
ters, the Kaldor facts hold irrespective of the distribution of the expenditure
levels. This holds true since the marginal propensity to save out of capital
income is the same at all wealth levels (and the marginal propensity to save
out of labor income is zero for all households). An unforeseen shock on the
wealth distribution would change the demand structure, but not the aggre-
gate saving rate. Consequently, capital accumulation, growth and the pace
of structural change would be unaffected.
Part (ii) of Proposition 1.2 emphasizes the equilibrium’s non-balanced
features on the sectoral level. Although the Kaldor facts hold, the aggregate
expenditure share devoted to goods as well as the relative price between
goods and services change over time. The functional forms the simple model
imposes are notable too. The model predicts that both the expenditure
share of goods and the relative price of goods decrease at constant rates.
Remarkably, this is consistent with the functional form of the stylized facts
depicted in Figure 1.1 and 1.2.
The shift in the aggregate demand structure transmits to the production
side (see (1.36)). Capital allocated to the goods sector grows at a lower
rate than the aggregate capital stock, which itself grows at a lower rate than
capital allocated to the service sector. In contrast to g∗K1 and g
∗
K , g
∗
K2
(t)
expands at a time varying rate. The same applies to the allocation of labor.
If n is small relative to g∗S1 , the absolute quantity of labor allocated to the
goods sector can even decrease. Nevertheless, consumption of both goods
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and services increase steadily – even in per-capita terms. Thus, the goods
sector declines only in relative and not in absolute terms.
The required parametric restrictions (1.28)-(1.31) are harmless. Recon-
ciliation of the non-balanced features of growth with the Kaldor facts does
not depend on any knife-edge condition. (1.28) ensures positive capital ac-
cumulation and growth in per-capita terms. Condition (1.29) is necessary
and sufficient for the transversality condition to hold. Furthermore, it is also
sufficient to ensure finite utility. Condition (1.30) makes sure that condition
(1.3) is met for all households at t = 0. Moreover, together with condition
(1.31), it ensures condition (1.3) along the entire equilibrium path.
In general, the structural change is driven by income and substitution
effects. With ǫ > 0 services are luxuries. Hence, due to per-capita growth,
the expenditure share devoted to services tends to increase. In addition,
if the relative price changes (i.e. g1 6= g2), there is a substitution effect.
Since the elasticity of substitution between the two consumption sectors is
strictly less than one, the expenditure share of the sector with the higher TFP
growth rate tends to decrease. The magnitude of the income and substitution
effects is controlled by the exogenous preference parameters γ and ǫ. With
ǫ = 0 we have homothetic preferences and changes in expenditure shares
are exclusively determined by the substitution effect. With g1 = g2 the
relative price does not change and the entire structural change is driven by an
income effect. In general, income and relative price effects can go in opposite
directions. If, by sheer coincidence −γ(g1−g2) = ǫ [g2 + (1− α) [g
∗
E − n]], the
two effects cancel each other so that there would be no structural change.22
In the next proposition the income and substitution components of struc-
tural change and the model’s cross-sectional predictions are analyzed in more
detail.
PROPOSITION 1.3. Along the equilibrium path,
(i) for all households, the expenditure share devoted to goods changes at a
constant rate g∗S1 ≤ 0.
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(ii) according to the substitution effect, a decrease of the relative price of
goods by one percent, decreases the expenditure share devoted to goods
of household i by −γ + ǫsi1(t) ≤ 0 percents.
(iii) for all households, according to the income effect, an increase of the
per-capita expenditure level by one percent, decreases the expenditure
share devoted to goods by ǫ percents.
Proof. Part (i) follows from (1.6) and the fact that gei = g
∗
E − n, ∀i, t. s
i
1(t)
can be written in terms of prices and attained utility level, Vi(t), as (see (A.1)
and (1.6))
si1(t) = β
[
ǫ
[
Vi(t) +
β
γ
[
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ
+
1
ǫ
−
β
γ
]]−1 [
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ
.
For the elasticity of si1(t) with respect to
P1(t)
P2(t)
we then get−γ+ǫβ
[
P2(t)
ei(t)
]ǫ [
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ
,
or −γ + ǫsi1(t), which is non-positive since s
i
1(t) ≤ 1 and γ ≥ ǫ. Part (iii)
follows immediately from (1.6). Q.E.D.
The model predicts that not only the aggregate, but also all individual
expenditure shares of goods decrease at the identical, constant rate g∗S1 . This
is consistent with the linear and parallel decline of the logarithmized expen-
diture shares of different income quintiles (see Figure 1.3). However, as part
(i) and (ii) of Proposition 1.3 show, if ǫ > 0, the division of this change in
expenditure shares into an income and substitution effect differs across house-
holds. For richer households (with a lower si1(t)), the substitution effect is
relatively more important. Consequently, as all si1(t) decline, the relative
importance of the income effect as a determinant of the aggregate structural
change decreases over time. Since preferences allow for a representative agent
in Muellbauer’s sense, the substitution effect of the aggregate economy is the
same as the substitution effect for the representative agent. Hence, a one
percent decline in the relative price of goods decreases (according to the sub-
stitution effect) the aggregate expenditure share of goods by −γ+ ǫS1(t) ≤ 0
percents.
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An alternative way to illustrate how well the model fits the cross-sectional
data is to look at the suggested relationship between the expenditure struc-
ture and the per-capita expenditure level. Logarithmizing both sides of (1.6)
gives
log si1(t) = b(t)− ǫ log ei(t), (1.38)
where b(t) ≡ log [βP2(t)
ǫ−γP1(t)
γ]. Consequently, the model predicts – after
allowing for a time dependent intercept b(t) – an iso-elastic relation between
the expenditure share of goods and the per-capita expenditure level of dif-
ferent households. Figure 1.6 depicts the partial correlation between the
logarithm of these two variables for the income quintiles already considered
in Figure 1.3. It is striking how well a linear line approximates the relation-
ship.
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Figure 1.6: Scatter plot of cross-sectional variation
Notes: The figure depicts the partial correlation between the logarithmized expenditure level per-equivalent scale and
the logarithmized expenditure share of goods of a given income quintile, where we allowed in each year for a separate
(distinct) intercept. The slope of the fitted line is −0.2214. This slope is the same as if we regress the logarithmized
expenditure share on the logarithmized expenditure level per equivalent scale and time dummies. The R2 of this
underlying regression is 0.9494 and the standard error of the slope coefficient is 0.0042. Source: Consumer Expenditure
Survey.
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It is insightful to take a closer look at the equilibrium toward which the
economy converges, as time goes to infinity. To do so, we define:
DEFINITION 1.2. The asymptotic equilibrium is the dynamic competitive
equilibrium path toward which the economy tends as time goes to infinity.
Then, we have the following proposition (asymptotic equilibrium values
are denoted by a superscript A).
PROPOSITION 1.4. Suppose, condition (1.31) holds with strict inequality
(i.e. there is structural change). Then, in the asymptotic equilibrium,
(i) the expenditure share devoted to goods is equal to zero, i.e. SA1 = 0.
(ii) the expenditure elasticity of demand is 1 − ǫ for goods and unity for
services.
(iii) the elasticity of substitution between goods and services, σAi , is equal to
1− γ for all households i.
Proof. Since (1.31) holds with strict inequality S1 converges to 0 (see (1.35))
and the elasticities of Lemma 1.3 converge to the corresponding values.
Q.E.D.
Part (i) of Proposition 1.4 shows that the service sector is the asymp-
totically dominant consumption sector. The existence of an asymptotically
dominant sector is a common feature of the models by Ngai and Pissarides
(2007), Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) and Foellmi and Zweimueller (2008).
The asymptotic dominance of the service sector is not a fact of a trivial disap-
pearance of the good sector. In absolute terms, the asymptotically consumed
quantity of goods goes to infinity – even in per-capita terms.
Part (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1.4 illustrate how parsimonious the model
is. The expenditure elasticity of demand and the elasticity of substitution
across sectors control size and magnitude of relative price and income effects
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on S1. The model has exactly two exogenous parameters, ǫ and γ, which
control separately the asymptotic values of these two elasticities. In general,
with ǫ 6= 0 and g1 6= g2, both income and relative price effects are even
asymptotically present (note that all the properties stated in Proposition 1.2
hold asymptotically too). With ǫ = 0 the asymptotic equilibrium is similar
to the one by Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
There is no income effect and the elasticity of substitution across sectors is
constant. With g1 = g2, there is no relative price effect and the asymptotic
equilibrium resembles the one by Foellmi and Zweimueller (2008). But in
contrast to Foellmi and Zweimueller (2008), where the expenditure elasticity
of demand of the asymptotically dominated sectors converge to zero, it can
in this model be set to any value between 0 and 1.23
So far, it has been shown that the model is consistent with a unique
dynamic competitive equilibrium path, along which the Kaldor facts hold and
changes in expenditure shares and relative prices occur. Furthermore, the
functional form of these nonbalanced features is consistent with the dynamics
observed in the U.S. data on the aggregate as well as on the cross-sectional
level. Two model parameters – ǫ and γ – determine the magnitude of the
income and substitution effect on the structural change. It is the aim of the
next section to quantify these two forces.
1.3 Empirical quantification
1.3.1 Quantitative replication of the structural change
According to the theoretical model of section 1.2, the structural change in
aggregate expenditures is described by (see (1.15))
g∗S1 = −ǫ
(
g∗E − g
∗
P2
− n
)
+ γ
(
g∗P1 − g
∗
P2
)
. (1.39)
In this expression we already made use of the constancy of the involved
growth rates, which is the model’s general equilibrium implication (see Propo-
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sition 1.2). The data suggests that the growth rate of the expenditure share
devoted to goods, g∗S1 , is −0.010, the growth rate of per-capita expenditures
in terms of services, g∗E − g
∗
P2
− n, is 0.016 and the growth rate of the price
of goods relative to services, g∗P1 − g
∗
P2
, is −0.016.24 When we plug these
values into (1.39), we conclude that the model is quantitatively consistent
with the observed structural change, growth and relative prices as long as
the (ǫ, γ)-combination fulfills
ǫ+ γ = 0.625. (1.40)
1.3.2 Estimating ǫ and γ
Equation (1.40) is uninformative about the relative importance of the sub-
stitution and income effects. However, with equation (1.38) the theoretical
model makes a very precise prediction about the cross-sectional variation in
the expenditure structure. In order to identify ǫ, this suggests to regress the
logarithmized expenditure share of goods on a time fixed effect and the log-
arithmized expenditure level. But there arises one additional difficulty with
this regression. Expenditures classified as “goods” include some quantitative
important durable items as cars or furniture. And we observe in the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey a household’s expenditures for only a relatively
short period of time (up to a maximum spell of 4 quarters). Hence, in the
simple regression, households which happen to buy a new car in the observed
quarter have very high per-capita expenditures and would (wrongly) be con-
sidered as extraordinary rich. Since buyers of a new car have at the same
time an exceptionally high goods share, the simple estimate for ǫ is biased
towards zero. As a solution, I use the logarithm of the household’s yearly
after tax labor income plus transfers per equivalent scale as an instrument
for the logarithmized per-capita expenditure level.25 The results obtained by
this IV approach are summarized in Table 1.1. The estimate for ǫ is always
positive and statistically highly significant. When we additionally control
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Table 1.1: Cross-sectional estimation of ǫ
Dependent variable: log si
1
(t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
− log ei(t) 0.181
∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Children share 0.203∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Elderly share −0.077∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Residence indicators No No Yes Yes
Family size indicators No No Yes Yes
Ref. person controls No No No Yes
Observations 450,602 450,602 404,079 404,079
R2 0.012 0.026 0.031 0.036
Method IV IV IV IV
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10
percent. All regressions include quarter fixed effects (96 groups). The logarithmized expenditure level per equivalent scale
is instrumented by the logarithmized after tax labor earnings plus transfers per equivalent scale. “Children share” and
“Elderly share” measures the share of household members with age < 18 and ≥ 65, respectively. “Residence indicators”
consists of regional dummies (4 groups), a rural/urban dummy as well as indicators of different population density of the
city of residence (5 groups). “Family size indicators” consists of 11 groups. “Ref. person controls” consists of the age, the
sex and a race indicator (4 groups) of the reference person.
for other household and reference person characteristics the estimate for ǫ
increases slightly above 0.2 (see column (2) to (4)).26
Hence we conclude that the cross-sectional data allows us to identify ǫ
and suggests that a value of about 0.22 is reasonable. This value implies an
expenditure elasticity of demand for goods of 0.78. An alternative way to
infer who reasonable this parameter value is, is via the implied elasticity of
substitution. With ǫ = 0.22, a replication of the structural change implies
for γ a value of 0.405 (see (1.40)). According to Proposition 1.4, 1 − γ
can be interpreted as the asymptotic value of the elasticity of substitution.
Hence, with γ = 0.405 the elasticity of substitution of the representative
agent converges (from below) to 0.596. This value is in the range of other
estimates and calibrations of the elasticity of substitution (see footnote 9).27
This highlights that both channels of structural change are of empirical
importance. The model could potentially generate the observed structural
change with an income effect alone (and an asymptotic elasticity of substitu-
tion equal to unity). But this would require an ǫ of 0.625 (see 1.40), denoting
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an expenditure elasticity of demand for goods of 1−ǫ = 0.375. Such a strong
income effect is clearly at odds with the cross-sectional data. Conversely,
however the homothetic case with ǫ = 0 is also clearly rejected by the data.
With the parameter values ǫ = 0.22 and γ = 0.405 the model suggests that in
1946, 44 percent of the observed structural change is attributed to a relative
price effect, whereas the remaining 56 percent are attributed to the income
effect.28 In 2011, the corresponding numbers are 53 percent and 47 percent,
respectively. Furthermore, the model predicts that the relative contribution
of the substitution effect will asymptotically converge to 65 percent.29
1.4 Conclusion
This paper presented a parsimonious growth theory, which is consistent with
structural change, relative price dynamics and the Kaldor facts. The model
allows us to analyze both explanations of structural change – income and
substitution effects – simultaneously. To the best of my knowledge, such a
theory did not exist yet.
The virtues of the theory are twofold. First, the model’s functional form
fits the data very well and the framework can replicate the observed structural
change quantitatively. Moreover, not only the model’s predicted dynamic
of the aggregate expenditure shares, but also the predicted cross-sectional
variation is confirmed by the data. And the paper shows how this cross-
section variation can be exploited to estimate the model’s key parameters
and quantify the two driving forces of structural change.
The second virtue is given by the exact replication of the Kaldor facts,
which is clearly desirable from an empirical point of view. In the data we
see a fast and persistent structural change. Reconciling this with a relatively
stable interest, saving and aggregate growth rate is challenging. Although
some calibrations of models of structural change are approximately consistent
with the Kaldor facts, others are clearly not. This paper suggests that this
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shortcoming is mainly an artifact of the functional form of the specified
intratemporal utility function.
Additionally, the exact replication of the Kaldor facts is very appealing
from a theoretical perspective too. Structural change is interrelated to many
important aspects of demographics, labor supply, income inequality and con-
vergence, international trade or biased technical change. These phenomena
are often outlined in standard one-sector neoclassical growth models (with
balanced growth). To analyze them in a multi-sector model, a tractable
theory of structural change is just a starting point. I hope the presented
framework provides to be useful in order to study these important questions.
Notes
1. Changes in relative prices affect the expenditure structure whenever the elasticity of substitution
across sectors is unequal to unity. This mechanism of structural change goes back to Baumol (1967),
who emphasizes total factor productivity (TFP) growth differences as a source of relative price changes.
In Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008), capital deepening and sectoral factor intensity differences is another
determinant of the relative price dynamic. But in contrast to Ngai and Pissarides (2007) the Kaldor facts
hold only asymptotically.
2. Note that a constant elasticity of substitution implies that relative nominal expenditures are an
iso-elastic function of the relative price, where the elasticity is one minus the elasticity of substitution.
3. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) conclude: “It would be particularly useful to combine the mech-
anism proposed in this paper with nonhomothetic preferences and estimate a structural version of the
model with multiple sectors using data from the U.S. or the OECD.”(Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008, p.
493).
4. This mechanism of structural change is consistent with Engel’s law, which is regarded as one of the
most robust empirical regularity in economics (see Engel, 1857; Houthakker, 1957; Houthakker and Taylor,
1970 and Browning, 2008). As a consequence, many models of structural change rely on income effects.
See e.g. Matsuyama (1992), Echevarria (1997), Laitner (2000), Caselli and Coleman (2001), Kongsamut,
Rebelo and Xie (2001), Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002) and Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) which
use quasi-homothetic intratemporal preferences or Falkinger (1990), Falkinger (1994), Zweimueller (2000),
Matsuyama (2002), Foellmi and Zweimueller (2008) and Buera and Kaboski (2009b), which generate
non-homotheticity by a hierarchy of needs.
5. In Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001) consistency with the Kaldor facts relies on a widely criticized
knife-edge condition, which ties together preference and technology parameters and implies constant rela-
tive prices. Foellmi and Zweimueller (2008) have to assume that technological differences are uncorrelated
with the hierarchical position of a good (and its sectoral classification).
6. See also the recent empirical works by Buera and Kaboski (2009a) and Herrendorf, Rogerson and
Valentinyi (2009), which estimate the relative contribution of income and substitution effects for the U.S.
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structural change. In contrast to these two papers, the structural estimation of this work is based on a
preference specification which is consistent with the Kaldor facts. Moreover, its is an explicit ambition of
this paper to be consistent with the cross-sectional (expenditure) data.
7. For ǫ = 0 we get the limit case with V (·) = log
[
ei(t)
P2(t)
]
− β
γ
[
P1(t)
P2(t)
]γ
+ β
γ
and with γ = ǫ = 0 we
would obtain Cobb-Douglas preferences with V (·) = log
[
ei(t)
P1(t)βP2(t)1−β
]
. As another special case, with
β = 0, we would have only one consumption sector and CRRA preferences.
8. Appendix A.2 shows that the class of preferences specified in this paper is the most general class
of intratemporal preferences defined over two sectors implying a behavior which is jointly consistent with
a constant (negative) growth rate of the expenditure share devoted to one sector (see Figure 1.1) and a
constant (positive) growth rate of per-capita expenditures (one of the Kaldor facts) in an environment
where the relative price changes at a constant rate too (see Figure 1.2).
9. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) and Buera and Kaboski (2009a) calibrate their models with an
elasticity of substitution equal to 0.76 and asymptotic 0.5, respectively. And in Herrendorf, Rogerson
and Valentinyi (2009) the model’s best fit of final consumption shares is attained with an asymptotic
elasticity of substitution equal to 0.81 (or 0.52, respectively if government consumption is excluded).
Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution between goods and services has been of interest in international
macroeconomics in order to use it as a proxy for the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-
tradable commodities. Also in this literature the elasticity of substitution has consistently been estimated
to be lower than unity (see e.g. Stockman and Tesar, 1995 who obtain a value of 0.44).
10. The utility function (1.2) could also generate cases where the expenditure elasticity of demand for
goods or the elasticity of substitution exceeds unity. But because they are not empirically relevant, these
cases where excluded by the restriction 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ γ < 1.
11. For ǫ = 0, we have - according to Muellbauer’s definition - the limit case with eRA(t) =
E(t)
N(t)
.
12. With ǫ > 0, a high dispersion of per-capita expenditure levels is associated with a low value of φ.
In the homothetic case, we have a representative agent economy (in the narrower sense), where inequality
does not matter (i.e. φ = 1).
13. In contrast to models with 0/1 preferences and intertemporal optimization (see e.g. Foellmi and
Zweimueller, 2006 and Foellmi, Wuergler and Zweimueller, 2009) this model focuses on the intensive
margin of consumption. Moreover, the model here allows us to study any – possibly continuous – income
distribution with a lower bound such that condition (1.3) is fulfilled.
14. Appendix A.4 shows how these sector specific TFP growth rates can be endogenized.
15. With β = 0 and g2 = 0 the model would coincide with the one by Rebelo (1991).
16. Where – as specified above F (Kj(t), exp [g3t]Lj(t)) is the neoclassical production function of the
investment sector. This approach is chosen by Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001) and by Foellmi and
Zweimueller (2008). In addition, they both (have to) assume that Aj(t), j = 1, 2 is constant over time.
17. In contrast to this, A1(t) could follow any process and aggregate growth would still be balanced.
But in order to be consistent with the data presented in Figure 1.1 and 1.2 (and also in line with the large
body of the literature) productivity growth is assumed to occur in the good sector at a constant rate too.
18. In this case the model is relatively similar to the one by Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) and the
Kaldor facts hold only asymptotically. However, in this paper, structural change is also determined by an
income effect.
19. The growth rate of the partial true cost of living price index of household i is defined as gTCLP (t) =
gP2 (t) + s
i
1(t)
[
gP1 (t)− gP2 (t)
]
(see Pollak, 1975). In the data, relative price growth rate is -1.6 percent
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and in 2011 the aggregate expenditure share of goods was 0.34, whereas its asymptotic value is zero.
Hence, measured by the true cost of living price index of the representative household, the model predicts
the real interest rate in 2011 to be 0.005 higher than its asymptotic value.
20. This is due to the AK specification of the production function of investment goods. With a
decreasing marginal product of capital, transitional dynamics would arise.
21. With ǫ = 0, this interdependence reflects the result obtained by Ngai and Pissarides (2007): If
preferences are homothetic, reconciliation of structural change with the Kaldor facts requires that the
intertemporal substitution elasticity of expenditures is equal to unity.
22. A trivial case, where this condition is fulfilled arises if neither an income nor a substitution effect
exists. This occurs with homothetic preferences and a constant relative price (ǫ = g1 − g2 = 0) or with
Cobb-Douglas preferences (ǫ = γ = 0).
23. This flexibility is also an important difference to theories relying on generalized Stone-Geary
preferences, where the asymptotic expenditure elasticity of demand is unity for all sectors. This asymptotic
inexistence of income effects leads to a suboptimal fit of the data, as Buera and Kaboski (2009a) show in
their calibration: “The model fails to match the sharper increase in services and decline in manufacturing
after 1960. [...] Explaining this would require a large, delayed income effect toward services. This is not
possible with the Stone-Geary preferences, where the endowments and subsistence requirements are most
important at low levels of income.” (Buera and Kaboski, 2009a, p. 473-474.)
24. See Figure 1.1 and 1.2 as well as Figure A.1 in Appendix A.5, which also illustrate how well the
constant growth rates approximate the three series.
25. This solves the problem since in quarters in which households buy a new car the labor income is –
in contrast to total expenditures – not (by construction) above its average. An alternative approach would
be to group households according to their income. As it can be inferred from Figure 1.6 or table 1 in the
earlier version of this paper (see Boppart, 2011) this leads us to very similar estimates for ǫ. An advantage
of the IV regression is that it allows us to control for additional individual household characteristics.
26. Figure A.2 in Appendix A.5 shows the estimates for ǫ if we run the regression of column (4) in
Table 1.1 for each year separately. ǫˆ is very stable over time and apart from two exceptions always between
0.20 and 0.25.
27. Moreover, the combination ǫ = 0.22 and γ = 0.405 fulfills the assumed parametric restriction
0 ≤ ǫ ≤ γ < 1.
28. In 1946, the goods sector accounted for 60 percent of total personal consumption expenditures.
Then, the change in expenditure share attributed to the substitution effect is equal to an annualized rate
of (−0.405 + 0.22 · 0.6) · 1.6 = −0.435 (see Proposition 1.3).
29. For this numerical exercise we just had to pin down the two preference parameters ǫ and γ. A full
calibration of the model is provided in the appendix of Boppart (2011).
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Chapter 2
Online accessibility of academic
articles and the diversity of
economics
Chapter Summary
A key aspect of generating new ideas is drawing from different elements of
preexisting knowledge and combining them into a new idea. In such a process,
the diversity of ideas plays a central role. This paper examines the empirical
question of how the internet affected the diversity of new research by making
the existing literature accessible online. The internet marks a technological
shock which affects how academic scientists search for and browse through
published documents. Using article-level data from economics journals for
the period 1991 to 2009, we document how online accessibility lead academic
economists to draw from a more diverse set of literature, and to write articles
which incorporated more diverse contents.
AND THE DIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS
2.1 Introduction
Two elements broadly characterize academic research: (i ) the production of
knowledge in a “recombinant growth” framework (Weitzmann 1996, 1998a)
where new ideas represent innovative combinations of previous ones, and (ii )
attention as a scarce resource which limits researchers’ processing capacity of
existing ideas (Franck, 1999, Klamer and Van Dalen, 2002, Falkinger, 2007b).
Recombinant growth stresses the notion that the heterogeneity of existing
ideas which serve as input is positively linked to knowledge accumulation.30
The French mathematician Henri Poincare´ described this idea succinctly as
(Poincare´, 1910, p. 325): “Among chosen combinations the most fertile will
often be those formed of elements drawn from domains which are far apart.”
In such a process the preservation of diversity of academic publications is
important because a more diverse stock of knowledge enhances research pro-
ductivity. Limited attention, on the other hand, implies that what matters
specifically in this context is the diversity perceived by researchers. As Weitz-
man (1998a, p. 333) puts it: “[T]he ultimate limits to growth may lie not
so much in our ability to generate new ideas, so much as in our ability to
process an abundance of potentially new seed ideas into usable form.”31 This
local diversity (i.e. diversity perceived by an individual researcher) depends
on characteristics of researchers and on features of the technology used by
researchers to learn about existing ideas.
In this paper, we explore the effect of one such technological aspect, the
digitization of academic literature and its dissemination through the internet.
The internet marks a profound technological shock which affected the way
academic scientists search for and browse through published documents. On
the one hand, the internet exemplifies a huge increase in the availability of
scientific articles at very low (time) cost. On the other hand, the internet of-
fers very powerful new tools such as search engines and hyperlinks to browse
through this sheer amount of information. The specific empirical question we
ask is how the internet affected the diversity of newly undertaken research by
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making the existing literature accessible online. The answer to this question
is far from obvious. The new tools and, especially, search algorithms may
allow researchers to find forgotten “lost pearls” and bring to their attention
contemporaneous articles they would not read habitually. However, the in-
ternet also entails –almost by an empirical law– very unequal distributions of
attention (Huberman, 2003). Evans (2008) documents that as more scientific
articles became available online more recent articles were referenced more of-
ten and citations were more concentrated on fewer documents. In contrast
to these aggregate measures of diversity, we focus on local ones measuring
how diverse the ideas are a publication contains or is based on. Our results
show that these local measures of diversity increase with the share of relevant
literature being accessible online. These empirical findings can be linked to
theoretical models of attention economies where comparative statics predict
that increases in the diffusion of sender signals may diminish the equilibrium
number of senders while resulting in access to a larger variety of senders for
each individual receiver (Falkinger, 2007a, 2008).
The data we analyze consists of roughly two decades of publications in
core economics journals, starting in the pre-internet era and including the
complete transition to full digitization. Our paper exploits the same basic
exogenous variation in the date of online publication across different journals
and across volumes within journals pioneered by Evans (2008), and con-
tributes to a small and very recent literature relying on the same source of
variation which explores the impact of online access for the economics pro-
fession (Depken and Ward, 2009; McCabe and Snyder, 2011).32 So far, this
literature has focused primarily on the impact that articles’ online access
had on these articles’ number of citations. Depken and Ward (2009) show
that access to the online platform “Journal STORage” (JSTOR) increases
the number of citations to journals contained in JSTOR as well as to older
journal volumes. McCabe and Snyder (2011) document that the number of
citations a publication receives increases by about 10 percent as it is included
in JSTOR and that this effect is about the same both for often-cited as well as
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rarely-cited papers. By studying the impact on upcoming articles’ contents,
our research addresses quite a different aspect of the scientific process.
Section 2.2 introduces our two measures of diversity. The construction of
our measure of online accessibility and our identification strategy are outlined
in detail in section 2.3. Estimation results are discussed in sections 2.4 and
2.5 and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Two measures of diversity
Our analysis considers two measures of diversity: (i ) the distribution of pair-
wise geodesic distances of cited references and (ii ) the number of Journal of
Economic Literature (JEL) classification codes assigned to a publication.
The geodesic distance between two items is the shortest back-in-time con-
nection within the citation network.
The distribution of geodesic distances between the references of an article
is a distinct measurement of diversity: The share of short distances is high if
a publication draws only from one narrow and well-connected literature. In
contrast, higher shares of large distances result if the paper connects several
separated strands of the literature for the first time. The second measure of
diversity considered is the JEL codes assigned to a publication by the Amer-
ican Economic Association’s bibliography, EconLit.33 The JEL classification
indexes the contents of an article describing which fields and subfields it falls
into, and thus uncovers the breadth of an article within economics. In the
following, these two measures are explained in more detail.
The measures were obtained for every article published between 1991 and
2009 in 50 selected core journals of economic research. The list of journals
includes all “top five,”34 top field and second tier general interest journals
(as well as their historical predecessors). Table B.9 in Appendix B.1 provides
an alphabetic list of the journals.35
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2.2.1 Geodesic distances
Geodesic distances provide essential information about the structure of net-
works. Measures of network connectivity and centrality are usually charac-
terized by functions of these distances.36 The analysis of geodesic distances
in networks of academic citations dates back at least to De Solla Price (1965).
The previous literature is largely explorative and aims at describing the dis-
tribution of geodesic distances in particular citation networks (e.g. Yin et
al., 2006, Franceschet, 2012).37,38 By focusing on the distribution of geodesic
distances of articles’ references, we capture the local connectivity of refer-
ences, which we interpret as a measure of articles’ (local) diversity. This
local connectivity specific to citation networks has not been explored in the
literature so far.
The calculation of geodesic distances requires knowledge of the entire net-
work of citations. We downloaded from Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science
the list of references of all items published between 1955 and 2009 in the 50
core economics journals. The sample does not only include articles but also
notes, letters, book reviews etc., which gives rise to a total of 129,145 items.
To construct the citation network, references were matched back to the pub-
lished items. On average, we are able to match 36 percent of all references,
and 44 percent of references in articles published 1991 to 2009. Unmatched
references may refer to publications prior to 1955 or to publications in books,
working papers or disregarded journals. Finally, we calculated the shortest
back-in-time connection within the citation network for all binary pairs of
(identified) references.
In Figure 2.1, this process is illustrated for a paper-and-proceedings article
written by John Cochrane and Monica Piazzesi and published in 2002,39
visualized in the graphic in Panel (a) by a red node. This article made seven
references. Within our sample we can identify four of them and these items
are depicted as blue nodes.40 The four identified references give rise to six
bilateral connections (unordered pairs) among them. We then calculated for
each of the bilateral links the shortest back-in-time connection within the
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entire citation network spanned by the sample of over 100,000 items. In the
example of Figure 2.1, one of the references, Rudebusch (1998), cites another
one directly –Christiano et al. (1996)– which implies a geodesic distance
of one (Panel b). Moreover, Christiano et al. (1996) is linked to a third
reference, Cochrane (1989), via two connections; as is the case for Rudebusch
(1998) and the fourth reference, Clarida et al. (2000). Panel (c) plots these
geodesic distances of order two. The shortest connection from Clarida et
al. (2000) to Cochrane (1989), and to Christiano et al. (1996); as well as
between Rudebusch (1998) and Cochrane (1989), is given by three steps
(Panel d). We determine the geodesic distances iteratively up to a length of
3, giving rise to a probability mass function over four categories, with the
last category comprising geodesic distances strictly larger than three. In the
example of Figure 2.1, the fraction of pairwise geodesic distances of order
one, two, three and higher than three are 1
6
, 1
3
, 1
2
, and 0, respectively.
This simple example, chosen for illustration purposes, is not typical for
the dataset. The median article has 10 identified references and thus its
references’ citation network comprises 45 pairs. Over the whole sample period
1991-2009, the average fractions of these geodesic distances are 25, 27, 20,
and 28 percent.
2.2.2 JEL codes
Our second measurement of diversity is the number the JEL classification
codes assigned to a publication. Up to six three-digit JEL codes are assigned
by EconLit to each article and we downloaded this information from the
EconLit webpage. The first digit of a JEL codes is a letter which divides
economics into twenty main fields, such as “public economics” or “industrial
organization”. The JEL classification system was introduced in 1991 and
consequently we observe these classification codes only from then onwards.41
While half the articles fall into exactly one field according to the one-digit
definition, about 37 percent contribute to two fields, and somewhat over 10
percent have three one-digit JEL codes. There are large differences between
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Year
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
Cochrane and Piazzesi
Clarida et al.
Rudebusch
Christiano et al.
Cochrane
1
(a) Article with references
Year
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
Rudebusch
Christiano et al.
1
(b) Geodesic distance of order one
Year
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
Clarida et al.
Rudebusch
Christiano et al.
Cochrane
Strongin Rudebusch
1
(c) Geodesic distances of order two
Year
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
Clarida et al.
Rudebusch
Christiano et al.
Cochrane
Bernanke and Mihov
Strongin
Bernanke and Blinder
Leeper and Gordon
1
(d) Geodesic distances of order three
Figure 2.1: Geodesic distances of an article’s references
Notes: The Figure illustrates how geodesic distances of an article’s references are obtained, using the article by John
Cochrane and Monica Piazzesi, “The Fed and Interest Rates: A High-Frequency Identification”, American Economic
Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 2002, Volume 92, Issue 2, pp. 90-95. Panel (a) plots the article as a red node
and the four references identified in the data as blue nodes. Panels (b), (c) and (d) plot shortest back-in-time citation
paths between blue nodes (geodesic distances) as red lines. Blue nodes’ references relevant for these paths are plotted
in grey.
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journals; for instance, while the average article in Econometrica has about 1.1
one-digit JEL codes, the Journal of Development Economics’ average article
has about 2.3. The variation within journals is even larger. Relying on
journal-year fixed effects, this variation within a journal is the one exploited
in the empirical section. The last two digits classify the twenty fields into
narrower sub- and subsubfields resulting in a very subtle measure of diversity.
The median article has two three-digit JEL codes, while about one third of
articles have more than two. In our analysis we consider the number of
distinct one-, two- and three-digit JEL codes each as a separate dependent
variable.42
JEL codes constitute a unique and precise categorization of articles’ con-
tents beyond its main field, which other, similarly structured applications
such as patent citations lack. In such datasets the intellectual content of
a patent is limited to one “patent class” only. An example is the NBER
patent citations dataset (cf. Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001). Trajtenberg,
Henderson and Jaffe (1997) introduced a variable called “originality” which
is (the negative of the) Herfindahl concentration index of different patent
classes a specific patent cites. Clearly, our diversity measures are closely
related to this concept of originality.
2.3 Online accessibility of economics journals
For the online accessibility of publications we use data from two sources:
“Fulltext Sources Online” (FSO) and JSTOR. The FSO data contains, for
each year 1998-2009 and each online platform, information on which volumes
of which journal were accessible online.43 The FSO data contains this infor-
mation for the journals’ own webpage as well as for all major providers (such
as e.g. EBSCOhost, LexisNexis, ScienceDirect or WilsonWeb) with the im-
portant exception of JSTOR.44 Since JSTOR is one of the most important
providers of online access (and has been even more important historically)
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we augment the dataset with the information about the date of a journal
volume’s first download at JSTOR.
A satisfactory measure of online accessibility based on these data should
enable us to distinguish online accessibility from other secular time trends
such as general internet usage. Achieving this should be possible since re-
search projects differ in which subsets of the entire past literature are relevant
to them. We assume that articles cite all relevant past works (a requirement
stated in all journals’ article submission guidelines) and define an article’s
relevant (past) literature as the set of journals in which the article’s references
were published.45 Journals varied widely and unsystematically regarding the
date when they first went online and the pace with which their volumes’ back
catalogs were made accessible on the internet,46 so that, in general, online
accessibility will differ between articles with different relevant past literature
even if the articles were written in the same year.
2.3.1 Online accessibility treatment variable
In order to measure to which degree an article’s relevant literature has been
accessible online, we calculate the share of online accessible volumes47 of all
cited journals at the time the paper has (presumably) been drafted. More
formally, we denote the set of all journals by J . Suppose an article i has
been published in year t and cites the subset of journals J i ⊂ J . Indexing
the journals in J i by j, our online treatment is given by
Ti(t) =
∑
j∈Ji
aj(t− 1)∑
j∈Ji
hj(t− 1)
, (2.1)
where aj(t−1) is the number of volumes of journal j that have been accessible
online in the year t−1 on at least one platform and hj(t−1) is the number of
existing historical volumes at date t−1 published in journal j. This measure
of online availability of relevant literature is article-specific, since it depends
on the set of cited journals and their online accessibility.48 In the empirical
section the treatment defined in (2.1) is called percent online.
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The default behavioral model behind our treatment variable is that an
author facing zero online accessibility searches the relevant literature in print,
for instance by browsing his library’s collection of volumes aided by keyword
or abstract indexation systems; in contrast, another author whose relevant
literature is partially accessible online will browse this electronic literature
by using internet tools, while still using the same methods as the previous
author for the literature available only in print. In such a case, the use of
internet literature browsing and searching tools coincides exactly with our
online treatment variable. In practice, some deviations from such behavior
are likely. For instance, very low levels of percent online might not induce
researchers to search online; and, conversely, researchers whose literature is
almost entirely online might neglect the few remaining print-only volumes.
However, studies on researchers’ literature searching behavior suggest that
the joint use of print and electronic resources (with declining use of print) was
typical for researchers during the transition to full electronic access (Tenopir,
Hitchcock and Pillow, 2003; Boyce et al., 2004), so that percent online should
be a reasonable approximation to researchers behavior.49
A qualification needs to be made at this point. While we can compute
an article’s share of relevant literature which was accessible online, we do not
observe whether the article’s authors effectively used the internet to search
for related literature. Thus, online accessibility effects should be understood
as intention-to-treat effects of online access. In section 2.5 we use information
about aggregate time trends of subscriptions to online contents from other
studies to explore the relationship between accessibility and access.
A second remark relates to the question whether percent online could be
endogenously linked to diversity. Many plausible stories of endogeneity which
rely on differences in journal specific time trends are excluded by our journal-
year fixed effects specification. Another concern is that the top five journals
were available online from very early on. Thus, articles citing predominantly
top five journals might have a high measure of percent online. This would
bias the estimated effect if such articles were inherently more/less diverse.
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Similarly, researchers who tend to cite older literature (which has lower online
accessibility, on average) might be inherently more/less diverse, too. Since
any measure of online accessibility is bound to have such problems, we will
address these concerns in the empirical section through appropriate robust-
ness checks. For instance, we will test whether there is an online accessibility
effect when comparing articles with the same share of top five journals cited
or with the same age distribution of references.
A more challenging concern is that –beyond the differences between jour-
nals and over time– there might be some additional heterogeneity on the
author level. Specifically, consider the hypothetical case where online acces-
sibility has no effect on diversity, yet authors differ in the extent to which
they make use of diverse sources. Then, if the propensity to adopt the in-
ternet is correlated with the diversity of an author’s research agenda,50 we
would find spurious effects of the online treatment on diversity. We address
this concern by including author fixed effects (in addition to the journal-
year fixed effects). However, one should bear in mind that estimations with
author fixed effects might be too conservative since they exclude channels
through which the effect of online accessibility works. For instance, online
access could change the composition of “diverse” and “non-diverse” authors.
Therefore we see the regressions with author fixed effects as an important
robustness check but not our main specification.
2.3.2 Online accessibility and diversity over time
Our estimation sample includes the 45,553 articles or paper-and-proceeding
articles published between 1991-2009 in the 50 considered core journals. Fig-
ure 2.2 plots, for each year, the average share of existing volumes that were
accessible online on at least one platform. Online accessibility of economics
journals started in 1997 on the JSTOR platform. Since then, the back vol-
umes of the different journals were gradually scanned and uploaded, and in
2009 almost all publications were available online. Hence, the considered pe-
riod covers some years of the pre-internet era as well as the entire transition
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to full coverage. Until the turn of the millennium online access was clearly
dominated by JSTOR. Later, other platforms caught up. A large amount of
back volumes of Elsevier journals (which are not included in JSTOR) were
made accessible in 2005.
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Figure 2.2: The share of economics journal volumes accessible
online
Notes: The Figure plots for each year 1991-2009 the average share of existing volumes published in the 50 selected
economics journals which was accessible online on at least one platform.
Figure 2.3 plots the average number of one-, two- and three-digit JEL
codes assigned to an article. For the first years in our sample, the number
of assigned codes is constant. Then, it rises for all JEL code digits from
1995 onwards. Figure 2.2 and 2.3 reveal a positive time correlation of online
accessibility and the number of assigned JEL codes. But since the number
of assigned JEL codes might not be comparable between different years we
do not want to overstate this correlation. For instance, some additional JEL
codes were added after 1991. Moreover, the assigning process might have
changed over time.51
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Figure 2.3: The average number of JEL codes over time
Notes: The figure plots the average number of one, two and three digit JEL codes. The sample includes the 45,553
articles published between 1991-2009 in the considered journals.
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With 0.25, 0.27, 0.20 and 0.28, the four different categories of geodesic
distances have about the same relative prevalence (the summary statistics of
all variables can be found in Table B.8 in Appendix B.1). But these averages
mask huge cross-sectional variations. In the case of the geodesic distances,
the time trend is even harder to interpret than it is in the case of the number
of assigned JEL codes. The way geodesic distances are constructed generates
an inherent time trend, since the citation network is more comprehensive for
later years where our dataset covers more back volumes. This makes the
share of geodesic distances higher than three falling by construction.52 It
is the aim of our empirical strategy to exploit this cross-sectional variation
while controlling for any secular time trends in order to estimate the effect
of online access on the measures of diversity.
2.3.3 Identification strategy
As explained above, in the distribution of geodesic distances, time trends
emerge by construction. Such inherent time trends are present in the as-
signment of JEL codes, too. For instance, some three- and two-digit codes,
and even a one-digit code, have been introduced after 1991. Moreover, until
the mid 1990’s the production process set an upper bound of five for the
number of codes assigned to an article. For all these reasons it is indispens-
able to control for year fixed effects to disentangle the causal effect of online
accessibility from other ongoing trends.53
There are substantial differences in diversity measures between journals.
While it is not obvious that this journal-specific diversity is related to online
accessibility, such a correlation could arise if the relevant literature predom-
inant in some journals was accessible online later or earlier than in others.
To allow for changing time- and journal-specific heterogeneity in the most
flexible way, we account for journal-year fixed effects. Thus, the variation
which we use to estimate the effect stems from cross-article differences in the
share of the relevant literature that is online within a given year and a given
journal. Since the structure of the data consists of articles in journal-years
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forming an unbalanced pseudo-panel, we use the (linear) panel specification
Yiv = αTiv +X
′
ivβ + µv + uiv, (2.2)
where i indexes articles and v = v˜(j, t) journal-years. Thus, Yiv represents
the diversity measure of article i which was published in journal j and year
t. With slight abuse of notation, Tiv stands for the online treatment defined
in (2.1). X iv is a vector of possible article-specific control variables to be
discussed below, and β is a conformable parameter vector. µv denote fixed
effects specific to journals and years. Finally, uiv is an idiosyncratic shock.
Under mean independence of uiv from Tiv,X iv, and µv, the coefficient α mea-
sures the causal effect of a marginal increase in the share of literature online
on the diversity measure Yiv. Equation (2.2) can be estimated conveniently
using the OLS within-estimator.
2.4 The effect of online accessibility on diver-
sity
2.4.1 Baseline results
Estimation results for the baseline model (2.2) are collected in Table 2.1.
Panel I depicts the coefficient of the treatment variable percent online for
regressions on the number of one-, two- and three-digit JEL codes (first
three columns) and on the fraction of geodesic distances equal to one, two
and three (last three columns). In all regressions, the panel dimension of the
OLS within-estimator is journal-years, of which there are 859 unique groups.
The standard errors shown are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
the journal-year level.
Since the average of percent online varies from zero in 1991 to one in 2009,
the coefficients of the first three columns can be read as the total change in the
average number of JEL codes comparing a world without any online access to
54
AND THE DIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS
Table 2.1: Fixed effects regressions of percent online on diversity
variables, N=45,553
JEL codes Geodesic distances
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit Pr(g=1) Pr(g=2) Pr(g=3)
I. Regressions on percent online
Perc. online 0.2208∗∗∗ 0.3426∗∗∗ 0.3565∗∗∗ -0.0670∗∗∗ -0.0027 0.0589∗∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0360) (0.0408) (0.0120) (0.0104) (0.0079)
R2 0.0482 0.0679 0.0921 0.0044 0.0055 0.0219
II. Regressions on percent online and further control variables
Perc. online 0.1792∗∗∗ 0.2823∗∗∗ 0.2955∗∗∗ -0.0404∗∗∗ -0.0344∗∗∗ 0.0356∗∗∗
(0.0265) (0.0350) (0.0395) (0.0113) (0.0101) (0.0076)
R2 0.0727 0.0928 0.1135 0.1460 0.1018 0.0854
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. All regres-
sions estimated by the OLS within-estimator accounting for journal-year fixed effects
(859 groups). Robust standard errors clustered at journal-year level in parentheses. R2
is the squared correlation between dependent variable and prediction. Further control
variables in Panel II: paper-and-proceedings indicator, number of authors, number of
pages, number of references, number of journals referenced, percent references in data,
percent self-references, average number of references’ citations, average number of ref-
erences’ references.
one which provides full access to all 50 journals. The effect is substantial: the
coefficients —about 0.2 for one-digit JEL codes and about 0.35 for two- and
three-digit JEL codes— correspond to 39, 45 and 32 percent of the increase
of one-, two- and three-digit JEL codes in the data in the observed period.
Online accessibility has a diversity-enhancing effect on the distribution
of geodesic distances, too: The fractions of low geodesic distances (g = 1, 2)
are reduced and higher geodesic distances (g = 3, g > 3) are increased
as a consequence of online accessibility. The coefficients −0.067, −0.0027,
0.0589 and 0.0108, respectively can be read as percentage-point changes in
the fractions of geodesic distances.54 Thus, the fraction of shortest geodesic
distances (whose average over the entire period is 25 percent) is estimated
to have shrunken by about 6.7 percentage points due to online accessibility
of the literature.
While the regressions in Panel I control for any confounding journal-year-
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specific characteristics, there might be some further heterogeneity within
journal-years correlated to the treatment percent online which could drive the
effect. This is a stronger concern for the regressions on geodesic distances.
For instance, higher shares of long geodesic distances can result from citing
two types of relatively unconnected work. The first possibility is that the
references in question, while well-connected to other literatures, are relatively
unconnected between them. The second possibility is that the references in
question are relatively unconnected at all. While we would readily interpret
the first case as a sign of diversity, some might want to exclude the second
case from counting as diversity. To address this issue, Panel II adds to the
specification the average number of citations received by a reference and
the average number of references contained in a reference. In this way, the
online accessibility effect is computed for similarly well-connected reference
networks. The list of other control variables in Panel II includes a papers-
and-proceedings dummy, the number of authors, number of pages, number
of references made, number of distinct journals referenced, percent references
found in the data, and percent of self-references.
The effects in Panel II remain large and statistically significant. The
coefficients for the JEL code regressions are somewhat smaller than before.
This is mainly the result of controlling for number of pages and number
of different journals referenced, two variables mediating the effect of online
accessibility on diversity. Whether these variables are part of the causal effect
and should not be controlled for is to a large extent a matter of taste and
interpretation. The effect on the distribution of geodesic distances is slightly
larger overall, with about 7.5 percentage points being shifted from the lower
part of the distribution (g = 1, 2) to the right tail (g = 3, g > 3). While
without controls the shift was mainly from g = 1 to g = 3, now the effect is
more evenly distributed among the four categories of g.55
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2.4.2 Robustness checks
An important first robustness check for our results relates to the appropriate
lag of the treatment. The time when an article’s references were collected is
unknown and has to be inferred from the date of publication; there is also
bound to be differences in length of the publication process across articles. In
(2.1) we made the informed guess that the best approximation is the online
accessibility faced by authors one year prior to publication.56 Table B.2 in
Appendix B.1 explores alternative lags of zero, two and three years. Given
the heterogeneity in publication process length, it would be worrisome to find
that the results in Table 2.1 hold only under the one year lag. Comfortingly,
the results remain qualitatively the same for all lags explored, although the
effects are strongest for the one- and two-year lag, which is in line with our
expectations that a majority of the articles’ time from draft to publication
lies in the one-to-two-year range.
Next, we set out to assess the robustness of our treatment by exploring
other ways of capturing online accessibility. Implicitly, the treatment percent
online gives more weight to long-standing journals (with many volumes) be-
cause the percentage is calculated over the sum of all cited journals’ volumes.
An alternative which weights journals equally is to construct the treatment
as the percent online in the average journal cited.57 Similarly, treatment
can be defined as the percent of an article’s references that were online one
year prior to publication. This weights the journals by their share in the
reference list. Finally, instead of focusing on percentages, treatments can
also be constructed based on the absolute number of volumes online (an ap-
proach related to Evans, 2008). Table B.3 in Appendix B.1 documents that
the baseline results from Table 2.1 remain valid for any of these alternative
treatments.
Another robustness check is with respect to the data sources of online
access of the different platforms. Note that our measure of online accessibility
combines information obtained directly from JSTOR with the one collected
by FSO. Detailedness and quality of these two sources varies. Whereas FSO
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collects its data twice a year, JSTOR’s database is very precise.58 To make
sure that such differences between data sources are not influencing our results,
we constructed two treatments: one taking into account access provided by
JSTOR only, the second taking into account access on the remaining online
platforms contained in the FSO data. The results (displayed in Table B.6
in Appendix B.1) show that disaggregating the treatment by data source
delivers estimates that are very similar to the aggregate treatment in the
baseline specification.
The OLS estimator used in Table 2.1 gives the best linear fit for our model
of diversity and online accessibility without relying on strong distributional
assumptions. It also has the attractive property that the effects for the
geodesic distances add up to zero. In Table B.4 in Appendix B.1 we explore
an alternative, constant-elasticity specification which we estimate both by
OLS (using the logarithm of the dependent variables) and by Poisson Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood. Again, the effects (which are now to be interpreted as
approximate percental changes) are similar.
The last issue we explore is a refinement of the fixed effects. While defin-
ing fixed effects at a more detailed level can purge the online accessibility
effect from more confounding through unobserved heterogeneity, there is a
trade-off to be considered since such an approach entails a loss of precision
because of the higher number of fixed effects. In a first step, we treated
papers-and-proceedings issues of a journal as a separate journal. Since most
journals publish such issues, the number of panel units for these regressions
increased to 1, 456. As a logical consequence of such an approach we can
go even one step further and define a separate fixed effect for every single
issue published in every journal in the period. This gives over 4,800 fixed
effects. With both specifications, as the estimates in Table B.5 in Appendix
B.1 show, the results are only marginally affected.
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2.4.3 Author fixed effects
A more fundamental refinement of the fixed effects changes the panel di-
mension to a much less aggregated unit: the authors. While in our baseline
regressions we exploit the variation in online accessibility between articles
of a particular journal in a given year, a different source of variation comes
from repeated publications of the same authors.
Exploiting only the variation for a given author (group) changes the inter-
pretation of the coefficients, as the online accessibility effect being estimated
excludes some channels which are part of the effect using the within journal-
year variation. For instance, the availability of online literature may have
an impact on the composition of the pool of authors, increasing the share
of authors which are efficient users of online tools. In the estimation with
journal-years fixed effects this margin is part of the causal effect as the pool
of authors is not kept constant and changes with the spread of online accessi-
bility. While ultimately we favor this approach, the specification with author
fixed effects provides an important alternative view which shows the effect
of online accessibility for authors publishing repeatedly during this period.
We approach this issue from two perspectives. In the first take, we ex-
tract from the EconLit database all author names which appear at least in
two articles, leaving us with 12, 165 distinct authors.59 We cloned articles
with multiple authors to create one record for every author, and obtained a
total of 67, 903 observations. Observations corresponding to the same article
are clearly not independent, and the reported standard errors account for this
correlation. Indeed, we used two-way clustered standard errors (Cameron,
Gelbach and Miller, 2011) which are robust to heteroskedasticity and cluster-
ing at the article level, as well as at the author level. Moreover, in addition
to the control variables, we included a full set of journal-year indicator vari-
ables to account for these fixed effects, too. The results are printed in Panel
I of Table 2.2. Panel II contains results where the panel units are co-author-
groups (including groups of size one, i.e. single authors). There are 7, 307
such unique co-author-groups which have published more than twice in our
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Table 2.2: Author and co-author-groups fixed effects
JEL codes Geodesic distances
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit Pr(g=1) Pr(g=2) Pr(g=3)
I. Regressions with author fixed effects, N = 67, 903
Perc. online 0.0606∗∗ 0.1409∗∗∗ 0.1473∗∗∗ -0.0213∗ -0.0277∗∗ 0.0329∗∗∗
(0.0300) (0.0385) (0.0420) (0.0123) (0.0108) (0.0092)
R2 0.1617 0.1893 0.2283 0.1887 0.1676 0.1118
II. Regressions with author-group fixed effects, N = 21, 767
Perc. online 0.0512 0.1068∗ 0.1612∗∗ -0.0009 -0.0165 0.0242
(0.0418) (0.0571) (0.0640) (0.0188) (0.0157) (0.0148)
R2 0.1044 0.1404 0.1789 0.1475 0.1031 0.0685
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. All
regressions estimated by the OLS within-estimator. Regressions in Panel I account for
author fixed effects (12,165 groups). Panel I standard errors (in parentheses) robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustering at author (12,165 groups) and article level (41,441
groups). Regressions in Panel II account for co-author-group fixed effects (7,307 groups).
Panel II standard errors (in parentheses) robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at
co-author-group level. Further control variables in both Panels: complete set of journal-
year indicators, paper-and-proceedings indicator, number of authors, number of pages,
number of references, number of journals referenced, percent references in data, percent
self-references, average number of references’ citations, average number of references’
references.
data. The total number of articles they have written is 21, 767. As before, we
additionally include over 800 journal-year fixed effects and our list of control
variables. Standard errors are robust to clustering at the co-author-group
level.
The results in Table 2.2 are substantially less precise. Given the substan-
tial loss of degrees of freedom, this does not come as a surprise. It is the more
remarkable, therefore, that the results in this table reveal the same patterns
than those from the baseline regressions. To be sure, the coefficients are
attenuated compared to the baseline; still, we find that online accessibility
significantly increased the number of JEL codes, and that it transferred prob-
ability mass from the lower end of geodesic distances’ distribution (g = 1, 2)
to its right tail.
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2.5 Heterogeneity of the effects and further
results
Having established the robustness of the effect of online accessibility on the
diversity of academic articles in economics, this section explores the het-
erogeneity of the effect and possible channels through which it affects the
diversity measures.
2.5.1 The effect over time
A potential source of heterogeneity in the effect is time. While there are
many potential factors with a time trend, one of them has been highlighted
in the literature as particularly relevant for online accessibility: institutional
subscription to platforms providing online contents of economics journals
(i.e. effective online access). For instance, Depken and Ward (2009) and Mc-
Cabe and Snyder (2011) document that the number of institutions subscrib-
ing to JSTOR (and to Elsevier’s online contents) increased in the considered
period almost linearly (cf. Depken and Ward, 2009, Fig. 1, McCabe and
Snyder, 2011, Fig. 7). Table 2.3 shows estimation results for a specification
which adds an interaction of the treatment with a linear time trend, which is
bound to capture this effect of increasing online access. The time trend was
normalized to zero in 1997, so that the coefficient on percent online gives the
effect in that year. The effect on the JEL codes is indeed moderate in the
beginning of the period and shows an increasing time trend, suggesting that
as more researchers gained access to online contents the effect of online access
on the number of JEL codes became more prominent. However, results are
less clear-cut for the geodesic distance regressions, where the absence of a
time trend cannot be rejected.
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Table 2.3: Treatment interacted with time trend, N = 45, 553
JEL codes Geodesic distances
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit Pr(g=1) Pr(g=2) Pr(g=3)
Percent online 0.0366 0.1101∗ 0.0941 -0.0479∗∗ -0.0265 0.0195
(0.0484) (0.0635) (0.0696) (0.0213) (0.0162) (0.0141)
Perc. online × year 0.0319∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗ 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.0017 -0.0018 0.0036
(0.0088) (0.0122) (0.0142) (0.0044) (0.0034) (0.0030)
F -statistic 32.05 36.85 29.98 6.72 5.78 11.11
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 0.0032 0.0000
R2 0.0705 0.0948 0.1247 0.1483 0.0966 0.0827
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. All regressions estimated
by the OLS within-estimator accounting for journal-year fixed effects (859 groups). Robust standard
errors clustered at journal-year level in parentheses. The variable ”Perc. online × year” is normalized
to zero in 1997. F-statistics and p-values are for joint significance tests on coefficients of ”Percent
online” and ”Perc. online × year”. R2 is the squared correlation between dependent variable and
prediction. Further control variables: paper-and-proceedings indicator, number of authors, number
of pages, number of references, number of journals referenced, percent references in data, percent
self-references, average number of references’ citations, average number of references’ references.
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2.5.2 The effect across journals
The effect of online accessibility found in our baseline regressions could vary
greatly for different journals. While for the average journal the effect on di-
versity is positive, it could be that this aggregation masks negative effects for
certain classes of journals. To explore this issue we estimated a specification
with interactions for three classes of journals: the “top five” journals, general
interest journals, and field journals (Table 2.4).60 We find the same kinds of
effects as in the baseline regressions for every journal category. The effects
are most pronounced for second tier general interest journals, but the effects
are large for all three categories.
2.5.3 The composition of referenced journals and pub-
lication years
One way in which online accessibility may have influenced diversity is by
reducing the bibliographic importance of the journal an article appeared in.
The correlation between reading a particular journal and contributing to it
might have been weakened by the internet, leading to a more diverse pool of
influences. A second way in which online accessibility may have influenced
diversity is by increasing the importance of the “top five” journals, which
are journals publishing diversely to begin with. Two characteristics of these
journals are that they have a long publication history and that they were
among the first to be put online. Thus, researchers relying on online sources
were likely to rely on these journals. Table 2.5 addresses this issue. The
specifications for which results are shown add two regressors to the model:
the percent of an article’s references that were published in the journal where
the article appeared, and the percent of an article’s references that were
published in one of the “top five” journals. The results indicate that these
two channels explain some of the online accessibility effect. The variables
themselves are highly significant, the percent references to “top five” journals
increasing diversity, the percent references to the own journal decreasing it.
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Table 2.4: Treatment interacted with journal type, N = 45, 553
JEL codes Geodesic distances
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit Pr(g=1) Pr(g=2) Pr(g=3)
Perc. online × top 5 0.1519∗∗∗ 0.2344∗∗∗ 0.2780∗∗∗ -0.0239 -0.0498∗∗ 0.0170
(0.0458) (0.0577) (0.0687) (0.0214) (0.0227) (0.0133)
Perc. online × gen. interest 0.2613∗∗∗ 0.4154∗∗∗ 0.3856∗∗∗ -0.0608∗∗ -0.0311∗ 0.0391∗∗∗
(0.0673) (0.1015) (0.1102) (0.0246) (0.0184) (0.0129)
Perc. online × field 0.1727∗∗∗ 0.2739∗∗∗ 0.2813∗∗∗ -0.0443∗∗∗ -0.0266∗∗ 0.0452∗∗∗
(0.0375) (0.0481) (0.0542) (0.0149) (0.0122) (0.0107)
R2 0.0699 0.0907 0.1130 0.1458 0.1021 0.0829
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. All regressions estimated by the
OLS within-estimator accounting for journal-year fixed effects (859 groups). Robust standard errors clustered
at journal-year level in parentheses. R2 is the squared correlation between dependent variable and prediction.
Further control variables: paper-and-proceedings indicator, number of authors, number of pages, number of
references, number of journals referenced, percent references in data, percent self-references, average number of
references’ citations, average number of references’ references.
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The online accessibility effect on JEL codes is reduced by about 30 to 50
percent. It remains significant, however, suggesting that there are further
channels at work as well. The pattern is similar but less accentuated for
geodesic distances, where the joint reduction in the fraction of distances one
and two is about 20 percent.
Finally, we set out to quantify the importance of the age distribution of
an article’s reference for the effect on diversity. The results from regressions
including average citation lag (i.e. the difference in years between the article’s
publication year and that of its average reference) are shown in Table 2.6.
Average citation lag has been used as the primary dependent variable in pre-
vious work analyzing the impact of online accessibility on academic research
(Evans, 2008 and Depken and Ward, 2009).61 The fact that our coefficients
of interest remain virtually unaffected in size and statistical significance when
including citation lag shows that our direct measures of diversity go substan-
tially beyond the heterogeneity of references’ age distribution.
2.6 Concluding remarks
This paper documents how online accessibility of articles lead to an increase
in the diversity of upcoming economic research. We do so by considering
local measures of diversity, i.e. the diversity of ideas a single article touches
on or is based on. This is a sharp contrast to the aggregate measures of
diversity considered in Evans (2008) or McCabe and Snyder (2011). It can
well be, that the local diversity increases at the same time as the number of
overall cited articles decreases and the concentration of cited articles increases
(as suggested by Evans, 2008). For instance, different fields of economics
may get tighter connected, whereas in each field some “superstars” emerge.
However, the results of McCabe and Snyder (2011) suggest that in the case
of economics, online access did not skew the distribution of citations and
did lead to a decline in the number of uncited papers. Whether local or
aggregate measures of diversity are of interest depends on the context. And
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Table 2.5: Citing top 5 journals and own journal, N = 45, 553
JEL codes Geodesic distances
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit Pr(g=1) Pr(g=2) Pr(g=3)
Percent online 0.0928∗∗∗ 0.1742∗∗∗ 0.2183∗∗∗ -0.0461∗∗∗ -0.0096 0.0310∗∗∗
(0.0293) (0.0380) (0.0428) (0.0115) (0.0106) (0.0079)
Percent refs. to top 5 0.2478∗∗∗ 0.3589∗∗∗ 0.2448∗∗∗ 0.0431∗∗∗ -0.0982∗∗∗ 0.0137
(0.0420) (0.0529) (0.0569) (0.0119) (0.0101) (0.0085)
Perc. refs. to own journal -0.2895∗∗∗ -0.1569∗∗ -0.1597∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗ -0.0313∗∗ -0.0136
(0.0465) (0.0609) (0.0663) (0.0158) (0.0128) (0.0107)
R2 0.0728 0.0929 0.1090 0.1432 0.1218 0.0859
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. All regressions estimated by the
OLS within-estimator accounting for journal-year fixed effects (859 groups). Robust standard errors clustered
at journal-year level in parentheses. R2 is the squared correlation between dependent variable and prediction.
Further control variables: paper-and-proceedings indicator, number of authors, number of pages, number of
references, number of journals referenced, percent references in data, percent self-references, average number of
references’ citations, average number of references’ references.
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Table 2.6: Average citation lag, N = 45, 553
JEL codes Geodesic distances
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit Pr(g=1) Pr(g=2) Pr(g=3)
Percent online 0.1820∗∗∗ 0.2878∗∗∗ 0.3052∗∗∗ -0.0396∗∗∗ -0.0302∗∗∗ 0.0380∗∗∗
(0.0266) (0.0351) (0.0395) (0.0113) (0.0101) (0.0076)
Average citation lag -0.0019∗∗∗ -0.0037∗∗∗ -0.0067∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗ -0.0029∗∗∗ -0.0016∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
R2 0.0732 0.0937 0.1154 0.1453 0.1075 0.0917
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. All regressions estimated
by the OLS within-estimator accounting for journal-year fixed effects (859 groups). Robust standard errors
clustered at journal-year level in parentheses. R2 is the squared correlation between dependent variable
and prediction. Further control variables: paper-and-proceedings indicator, number of authors, number of
pages, number of references, number of journals referenced, percent references in data, percent self-references,
average number of references’ citations, average number of references’ references.
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it is unclear whether more diversity is a priori desirable. In the introduction,
we provided one example of a setting where such local diversity matters and
is desirable – a model of scientific research based on recombinant growth and
limited attention. In any case, our results suggest that online access did not
narrow but broaden the mind of economic researchers.
Notes
30. This dependence on the stock of preexisting knowledge is often called the “standing on the shoul-
ders of giants” effect (which goes back to a quote by Isaac Newton and now serves as an advertising slogan
of Google Scholar).
31. For a theoretical contribution how diversity can be measured and ranked see Weitzman (1992)
and (1998b). Stirling (2007) emphasizes “variety”, “balance” and “disparity” as three district properties
of diversity. Consisting of these three components, Van den Bergh (2008) analyzes optimal diversity in a
model of recombinant innovation.
32. A much larger literature exists on the impact of access to internet contents in more traditional
market settings. In a recent review of this literature, Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith (2010) stress that a
key channel through which information technology improvements changed how consumers learn about
goods and services, and how producers develop, distribute and deliver them, is through a transformation
in search and recommendation tools.
33. It is important to emphasize that these JEL codes are not the ones declared by the authors of a
paper. The codes we use are assigned by a team of economists at EconLit.
34. American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of
Economics and Review of Economic Studies.
35. The set of journals includes all journals considered in the standard Tilburg ranking, as well as the
list considered in Palacious-Huerta and Volij (2004). Furthermore, it includes all core journals in Conroy et
al. (1995), all journals used in Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2003), as well as all top 20 journals
in Combes and Linnemer (2011). The list is comparable to Depken and Ward’s (2009) and McCabe and
Snyder’s (2011) who include 79 and 63 economics journals, respectively. Using eigenfactor.org’s list of
over 200 economics journals, we found that our list has an eigenfactor score of around 0.75 in 1995. I.e.,
randomly traversing the citation network spanned by all economics journals, the list’s 50 journals are
selected 75 percent of the time.
36. Bavelas (1948) and Freeman (1979) provide early foundations. See Newman (2003) for an overview.
37. A related strand of the literature on scholarly communication studies social networks defined by
co-autorship relationships (Newman 2001a,b,c), as opposed to information networks defined by citations.
This literature, too, is foremost descriptive. For an exception, see Kretschmer (2004) who links co-author
networks features to author productivity.
38. The analysis of patents is also conceptually related to scholarly communication networks. For
instance, social networks akin to co-authorships are defined by inventor collaborations, and information
networks arise in the context of patent citations. Recent examples of papers studying geodesic distances
are Balconi, Breschi and Lissoni (2004), in the former context; and Lee, Su and Wu (2010), in the latter.
68
AND THE DIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS
39. “The Fed and Interest Rates: A High-Frequency Identification,” American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings, May 2002, Volume 92, Issue 2, pp. 90-95.
40. In the following we abbreviate all the sources by authors and publication date in italic without
specifying the entire reference. For the exact reference of the citations we refer the reader to the paper by
John Cochrane and Monica Piazzesi.
41. See Pencavel (1991), the editor’s note with which the Journal of Economic Literature introduced
the new system. The JEL codes replaced an earlier, more narrow classification system.
42. JEL codes have been the subject of some descriptive work which used them to characterize the
evolution of economic fields or subfields over time (Kim, Morse, Zingales, 2006; Kelly and Bruestle, 2011).
Previous literature using JEL codes in regression analysis has included them as control variables for the
specific fields (e.g. Formby, Gunther and Sakano, 1993, Axarloglou and Theoharakis, 2003, Boschini and
Sjo¨gren, 2007).
43. We assume that no volumes were accessible before 1998 on platforms covered by the FSO data.
This is reasonable, since only about 2 percent of volumes were online on platforms other than JSTOR
in 1998, and these accessible volumes were mainly the contemporaneous ones. For the historically most
important platform of online access, JSTOR, we do have the data about the accessibility of journals even
prior to 1998.
44. JSTOR is not included in the FSO database before 2009.
45. Evans (2008), whose units of observation are journal-years, considers the journal where an article
is published as the only relevant past literature. This approach seems unsuitable for economics. In our
data, on average only 7 percent of citations refer to the same journal where the article is published. Even
for the journal where this ratio is highest over the whole period – the Journal of Finance – it is only 20
percent.
46. Cf. Evans (2008), Depken and Ward (2009), McCabe and Snyder (2011).
47. We use the term “volume” to denote all issues of a journal published in the same calendar year.
48. The online treatment defined in (2.1) is based on two specific assumptions regarding (i) the set
of relevant literature and (ii) the time lag between first draft and publication of a paper. In section 2.4
we show that our results are robust to other reasonable specifications.
49. An alternative interpretation of the online treatment variable can be given assuming a different,
more stylized behavioral model where there exist only two types of researchers: one group using print
literature only, the other group relying exclusively on online literature. Then, percent online can be
interpreted as the probability that the article’s author is an online researcher.
50. For instance, younger researcher might adopt the new technology faster and might differ from
their older colleagues in terms of the diversity of their research interests.
51. E.g. the dint in the number of codes in 2006 might be explained by a change of EconLit’s managing
director. The assigning process is, however, consistent within a given year.
52. It is possible to try and capture this by partialling out some time trend. However, this requires
assumptions for the trend’s functional form. In Figure B.1 in Appendix B.1 a possible correction has been
applied. In that graph the average fractions of short geodesic distances (order one and two) fall over time,
while those of order higher than three increase. This would be in line with an increase in diversity over
the period. In contrast to Figure B.1, our regression framework presented in the next section, which does
include time fixed effects, does not require arbitrary assumptions about the time trend.
53. See also McCabe and Snyder (2011) who illustrate the empirical importance of flexible controls
of time trends.
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54. The coefficient of percent online in a regression on Pr(g > 3) is not shown in the table, but it can
be easily obtained from the three numbers depicted in the last three rows of the table, since it is equal to
the negative of the sum of the coefficients in the regressions for g = 1, 2, 3 (because shifts in the probability
mass of the distribution add up to zero).
55. The full set of estimates is shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B.1; summary statistics for dependent
variables and all regressors are in Table B.8 in Appendix B.1.
56. Evans (2008) uses the same lag specification, while Depken and Ward (2009) and McCabe and
Snyder (2011) use a lag of zero.
57. Formally, the treatment is then calculated as 1
|Ji|
∑
j∈Ji
aj(t−1)
hj(t−1)
instead of (2.1).
58. In fact, we know from JSTOR for each journal issue the exact date of first user access.
59. We used data from EconLit as we found it significantly more reliable than Thomson Reuters’,
which contained numerous inconsistencies in the coding of author names.
60. Note that uninteracted level effects are subsumed in the journal-year fixed effects.
61. Table B.7 contains further regressions including the median and standard deviation of references’
publication year. These results lead to the same conclusion that our measures of diversity capture a
different dimension of heterogeneity than the distribution of citation lags.
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Chapter 3
How does mechanization and
structural change sum up to a
constant aggregate labor’s
income share?
Chapter Summary
For decades, theories of economic growth aimed to replicate a constant aggre-
gate labor’s income share – for empirical as well as technical reasons. How-
ever, some sectors feature a systematically declining labor’s share whereas
it is constant in others. Consequently, the observed constancy of the ag-
gregate factor shares is only due to a counterbalancing effect of structural
change (i.e. labor intensive sectors account for an increasing fraction of the
aggregate economy). Standard growth models do not account for this com-
plexity. This paper provides a stylized growth theory in which both dynamics
– structural change and mechanization on a sectoral level – are present and
endogenous technical change leads to a constant aggregate labor’s income
share.
SUM UP TO A CONSTANT AGGREGATE LABOR’S INCOME SHARE?
3.1 Introduction
The labor’s income share is a widely debated variable with a long tradition
in the economic literature. Often it served as a proxy for the income dis-
tribution and involved political brisance. Nowadays it has become a key
(calibration) parameter in macroeconomic models in general. The dynamic
of the labor’s income share is importantly linked to technical change, growth
and development.
In the first half of the 20th century there emerged a consensus in the
economic literature that the labor’s income share is on the aggregate level
constant over time. Kaldor (1961) postulated the constancy of labor’s share
to be one of the “stylized facts” of growth. And since then, Kaldor’s stylized
characterization remains a good approximation of the data. Figure 3.1 plots
the U.S. labor’s income share for the period 1960-2007.62 Apart from smaller
fluctuations over the business cycle the variable is indeed very stable around
a value of 0.623.
However, it is not only due to this empirical fact, that virtually any the-
oretical growth model aims to replicate constant factor shares. The steady
state concept of growth is indispensably connected to a constant labor’s
share.63 Therefore, the existence of a balanced growth path (and the solvabil-
ity of dynamic models more generally) depends on a, at least asymptotically,
constancy of factor shares.
There are two well-known and frequently used specifications which allow
to replicate a constant labor’s income share in an one-sector theory of eco-
nomic growth: A Cobb-Douglas technology (see Cobb and Douglas, 1928)
or exclusively labor augmenting technical progress which occurs at the same
rate as the accumulation of capital. The vast majority of endogenous growth
models chooses the first solution with an Cobb-Douglas technology at the
micro-level.64,65 However, empirical evidence – as well as common-sense –
speaks for an elasticity of substitution between labor and capital which is
strictly smaller than unity.66
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate labor’s income share in the U.S.
Notes: The figure plots the labor’s shares of income in in the U.S. for the years 1960-2007. The labor’s share is
calculated as total labor compensation relative to total value-added. Source: World KLEMS (November 2011 release).
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Jones (2005) is a rare example of a one-sector endogenous growth theory
which can replicate a constant labor’s share although working with a produc-
tion function where capital and labor are complements. The model turns out
to be consistent with a constant aggregate labor’s share since from the per-
spective of a used micro-level production function, the technical progress is
purely labor augmenting.67 Another related contribution is Acemoglu (2003)
which shows that a model of directed technical change is consistent with
purely labor augmenting technical change if capital and labor are gross com-
plements and there is “extreme state dependence”, which means that there
are no knowledge spillovers between the capital and labor augmenting knowl-
edge stock.
This paper illustrates that the constancy of the labor’s income share is
due to the joint evolution of the labor’s share at sectoral level and structural
change. Consequently, in order to understand the mechanism behind the
constancy of factor shares we need a multi-sector model with sectoral tech-
nologies which allow for changing labor’s income shares (i.e. which are not
Cobb-Douglas). Figure 3.2 depicts the evolution of the labor’s income share
in three broadly defined sectors: a “progressive sector”, which encloses sectors
as agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transportation and communication; a
“non-progressive sector” which mainly summarizes service categories and a
“neutral” sector which consists of real estate.68 We see that the labor’s share
of the non-progressive and neutral sectors are constant over time whereas the
one of the progressive sector is declining. In this paper, the decline in the
progressive sector’s labor share is called “mechanization”.69
How can Figure 3.2 be consistent with a constant aggregate labor’s share?
Note that by definition, the aggregate labor’s income share at date t, α(t),
is a weighted sum of the sectoral labor’s shares αj(t), i.e.
α(t) =
∑
j=B,N,U
αj(t)Sj(t), (3.1)
where the weights, Sj(t), j = B,N,U are the value-added shares of the pro-
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Figure 3.2: Labor’s income shares on the sectoral level
Notes: The figure plots the labor’s income shares of three broadly defined sectors in the U.S. for the years 1960-2007.
The labor’s shares are calculated as total labor compensation relative to total value-added. The “progressive sector”
comprises the ISIC sections A to E and I (Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Total
Manufacturing; Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; Transport and Storage and Communication), whereas the “non-
progressive sector” contains the sections F to H and J to Q except K70 (Construction; Wholesale and Retail Trade;
Hotels and Restaurants; Finance, Insurance and and Business Services; Community Social and Personal Services). The
“neutral sector” consists of K70 (i.e. “Real estate activities”). Source: World KLEMS (November 2011 release).
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gressive, non-progressive and neutral sector, respectively.70 For the aggregate
factor shares to be constant the change in sectoral value-added shares (i.e.
the structural change) must exactly compensate the decline in the progres-
sive sector’s labor income share. This is possible if sectors with a relatively
high labor’s share constitute a continuously increasing fraction of the GDP.
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Figure 3.3: Value-added shares on the sectoral level
Notes: The figure plots the value-added shares of income in three broadly defined sectors in the U.S. for the years
1960-2007. The “progressive sector” comprises the ISIC sections A to E and I (Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and
Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Total Manufacturing; Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; Transport and Storage
and Communication), whereas the “non-progressive sector” contains the sections F to H and J to Q except K70
(Construction; Wholesale and Retail Trade; Hotels and Restaurants; Finance, Insurance and and Business Services;
Community Social and Personal Services). The “neutral sector” consists of K70 (i.e. “Real estate activities”). Source:
World KLEMS (November 2011 release).
Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of the value-added shares of the three sec-
tors. Indeed, the relatively labor intensive non-progressive sector is clearly
expanding at a faster rate than the aggregate economy, whereas the pro-
gressive sector’s value-added share is declining. The neutral sector is char-
acterized by a constant value-added share. So by taking the first derivative
of (3.1) with respect to time we see that the observed constancy of the ag-
gregate labor’s share (i.e. α(t) = α) is the product of the counterbalancing
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forces:
α˙B(t) =
S˙B(t)
SB(t)
[αN − αB(t)] , (3.2)
where we already made use of the (empirical) observation that the αN , αU
and SU are approximately constant over time. This equation (3.2), which ties
together the structural change between the progressive and non-progressive
sector and the pace of mechanization in the progressive sector, highlights
the underlying mechanism behind constancy of the aggregate factor share.71
Note that since both the labor’s share and the value-added share of the
neutral sector are constant this third sector is important in order to get
the aggregate level of the labor’s income share right, but is dispensable for
studying its dynamics.
It is the aim of this paper to provide a theory in which equation (3.2) is
endogenously fulfilled. But why should the mechanization of the progressive
sector and the structural change comove in such a particular way? In the
provided theory, directed technical change constitutes a link between the two
variables. On the one hand, directed technical change affects the evolution of
relative prices between sectors and therefore the structural change (as long
as the elasticity of substitution is not equal to unity). And on the other
hand, the ratio between the interest and wage rate determines the incentive
to engage in productivity enhancing activity in the progressive sector. This
investment incentive ultimately leads to a constant aggregate labor’s share.72
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides
the theoretical model and Section 3.3 discusses the results and concludes.
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3.2 Theoretical model
3.2.1 Representative household
There is a representative infinitely living agent with the following indirect
preferences
U(0) =
∫ ∞
0
exp [−ρt] log [U (E(t), PB(t), PN(t))] dt, (3.3)
where U (E(t), PB(t), PN(t)) is linearly homogeneous in the nominal expendi-
tures E(t) and declining in the prices of the progressive and non-progressive
sectors PB(t) and PN(t). We have ρ > 0. The intratemporal budget con-
straint is given by
XB(t)PB(t) +XN(t)PN(t) = E(t), (3.4)
where Xj(t), j = N,B represents consumed output of the progressive and
non-progressive sectors.
Assuming logarithmic intertemporal preferences is crucial in order to rec-
oncile balanced growth with structural change caused by relative sectoral
price dynamics (see Ngai and Pissarides, 2007). In line with the structural
change literature we assume that the utility function implies an elasticity of
substitution between the two sectors which is strictly smaller than unity. The
representative household owns V (t) units of wealth in a given instant of time
and supplies inelastically L units of labor. V (0) is exogenously given. The
households maximize utility subject to a standard flow budget constraint
V˙ (t) = V (t)r(t) + Lw(t)− E(t), ∀t, (3.5)
and a transversality condition
lim
t→∞
[
V (t) exp
[
−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
]]
≥ 0. (3.6)
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Intertemporal optimization then leads to the following Euler equation
gE(t) = r(t)− ρ, (3.7)
where gE(t) is the growth rate of nominal expenditures. Intratemporal
optimization allows us to write the optimal expenditure share devoted to
the progressive sector, SB(t), as a decreasing function of the relative price
PB(t)
PN (t)
≡ pB(t), i.e.
SB(t) ≡
PB(t)XB(t)
E(t)
= S˜B (pB(t)) , (3.8)
with ∂S˜B(pB(t))
∂pB(t)
< 0. The fact that SB(t) is decreasing in pB(t) is due to the
assumption that the elasticity of substitution is strictly smaller than unity.
3.2.2 Production and capital accumulation
Suppose the output of the progressive sector is produced competitively with
the following technology (see Aghion and Howitt, 2005)
XB(t) = ǫ
−ǫ(1− ǫ)−(1−ǫ)
∫ M(t)
0
Ai(t)
1−ǫxi(t)
ǫ
[
LB(t)
M(t)
]1−ǫ
di. (3.9)
This is a Cobb-Douglas function defined over a CES aggregate of intermediate
inputs xi(t), i ∈ [0,M(t)] and labor LB(t). We have ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Ai(t) is
the “quality” parameter of intermediate input variety i. Each variety i is
produced by a monopolist with constant marginal cost
ci(t) = c
(
w(t)
D(t)∆
, r(t)
)
, ∀i, (3.10)
where D(t)∆ is a labor-augmenting spillover, with ∆ > 1. Let us assume
that the technology (3.10) features an elasticity of substitution which is less
than unity. Then, the labor’s income share in the production of variety
i is increasing if and only if w(t)
C(t)∆
increases relative to r(t). Note that in
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neoclassical growth theory (as well as in the data) w(t) increases relative
to r(t). Hence, in order to reconcile a declining labor’s share with a micro
production function with gross complements we need technical change, i.e.
an increasing D(t).
The production function of the non-progressive sector is linear in labor
XN(t) = LN(t). (3.11)
Besides the two consumption goods, physical capital can be accumulated
according to the following law of motion
K˙(t) = I(t), (3.12)
where I(t) are investments (in terms of the investment good). The investment
good is produced according to a linear production function in capital
I(t) = AKI(t), (3.13)
where KI(t) is capital allocated to the investment good sector. We have
A > ρ.
Except of the variety markets i ∈ [0,M(t)] all markets are perfectly com-
petitive. Labor and capital is perfectly mobile across sectors and its factor
reward is denoted by w(t) and r(t), respectively. In the following we choose
the investment good as a nume´raire. We then obtain the following lemma.
LEMMA 3.1. Optimal price setting and cost minimization implies
pB(t) =

c
(
w(t)
D(t)∆
, r(t)
)
(1− ǫ)w(t)


ǫ
A¯−(1−ǫ), (3.14)
where A¯ ≡ 1
M
∫M
0
Aidi. The choice of nume´raire implies
A = r(t), ∀t. (3.15)
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Proof. Progressive output producers solve the following optimization prob-
lem (suppressing time indices):
min
{xi}
M
i=0,LB
wLB +
∫ M
0
pixidi
subject to
XB = ǫ
−ǫ(1− ǫ)−(1−ǫ)
∫ M
0
A1−ǫi x
ǫ
i
[
LB
M
]1−ǫ
di,
where XB is an exogenous output level. The multiplier attached to the
constraint can be interpreted as the (competitive) price of the output of the
progressive sector PB. Solving the optimization problem we get
PB =
[
Mw∫M
0
Aip
− ǫ
1−ǫ
i di
]1−ǫ
, (3.16)
and for the demand for xi
xi =
ǫ
1− ǫ
Aip
− 1
1−ǫ
i
wLB∫M
0
Aip
− ǫ
1−ǫ
i di
. (3.17)
Given this iso-elastic demand, it is optimal for each monopolist i to charge
a constant mark-up, i.e. pi =
c(·)
ǫ
. Substituting this into (3.16) we get
PB =
[
c(·)
ǫ
]ǫ
w1−ǫA¯−(1−ǫ), (3.18)
where A¯ ≡ 1
M
∫M
0
Aidi. Moreover, since we have PN = w the relative price
can be written as (3.14). Finally, (3.15) follows immediately from the choice
of nume´raire. Q.E.D.
Because of the iso-elastic demand the monopolists set a constant mark-up
over marginal costs and consequently all prices are proportional to marginal
costs. Then, the relative price pB is determined by two components: First,
by the ratio of the marginal costs of an intermediate input producer i and
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of a final non-progressive output producer. And second by the average qual-
ity of intermediate inputs. Note that the relative marginal costs depend on
the relative factor intensities and the relative factor price w(t)
r(t)
. Since the
production function of the non-progressive sector is linear in labor we have
two additional facts: (i) The labor’s share of the non-progressive sector is
constant over time and (ii) the non-progressive sector is always more labor
intensive than the progressive sector.73 Both of these implications are con-
sistent with the empirical patterns observed in Figure 3.2. Fact (ii) implies
that pB is increasing in r(t) and decreasing in w(t).
The fact that the investment good denominated interest rate is constant
over time is simply due to the AK technology in the investment good sector.
I make two additional assumptions: First, the spillover term is propor-
tional to the capital stock, i.e.
D(t) = D0K(t), (3.19)
where D0 is a constant. Second, as in Aghion and Howitt (2005) section 5, in
order to destroy a scale effect we assume that M(t) expands proportionally
to LB(t), or formally
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M(t) = LB(t). (3.20)
3.2.3 Quality choice
In every point in time t, each of the monopolists has to choose its quality
level Ai(t). In order to produce quality Ai(t) at date t the monopolist has to
incur fixed cost of [
Ai(t)
A¯(t)
]1+φ
D(t)r(t). (3.21)
The term in squared brackets states that it is more expensive to have a
quality which exceeds the average quality level. This term ensures that all
monopolists choose the same quality level at a given point in time. D(t) is a
(negative) spillover term. As the economy gets more “complex” (i.e. as D(t)
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increases) more capital is needed to run a production process of the same
quality.
Monopolists are exposed to a continuous threat to lose their monopoly
position. In any instant of time an incumbent is overthrown if a potential en-
trant is willing to produce at a higher quality. This implies that monopolists
make zero profits in equilibrium, or Ai(t) must be such that
xi(t) [pi − c(·)] =
[
Ai(t)
A¯(t)
]1+φ
D(t)r(t). (3.22)
The left-hand side of this equation are profits before fixed costs, whereas the
right-hand side are fixed costs. By substituting in the equilibrium demands
and prices we obtain the following lemma.
LEMMA 3.2. The optimal quality choice of monopolist i is characterized
by [
ǫ
D0
]
w(t) =
[
Ai(t)
A¯(t)
]φ
K(t)r(t). (3.23)
Proof. (3.23) is obtained by substituting (3.17), pi =
c(·)
ǫ
and (3.19) into
(3.22). Q.E.D.
A direct implication of (3.23) is that all intermediate input producer i
choose the same quality level, Ai(t) = A¯(t), ∀t. Then, (3.23) reduces to
Ξw(t) = K(t)r(t), (3.24)
with Ξ = ǫ
D0
. Now since L is constant over time and there are no other
production factors than capital and labor,75 (3.24) directly implies that the
aggregate labor’s income share is constant. Any other situation is incon-
sistent with the optimal quality choice. Why is this the case? First, the
exogenous change in the number of available varieties, (3.20), implies that
profits before fixed costs are proportional to the wage rate. Second, the as-
sumption that quality investments are in terms of capital makes the cost
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of quality improvement linear in the interest rate. Consequently, the opti-
mal quality choice is a trade-off which involves the relative factor price w(t)
r(t)
.
Finally, the spillover which is proportional to the size of the economy (see
(3.19)) makes the factor shares constant. However, another characteristic of
the cost of quality improvement specification (3.21) is also important: The
chosen quality level enters the equation only relative to the average. Hence
we have positive spillovers and from a social point of view a higher A¯ does
not require more physical investments. This allows A¯ to adjust flexibly until
condition (3.24) is fulfilled.
Knowing that the A¯(t) adjusts such that the aggregate labor’s share is
constant allows us to characterize the aggregate equilibrium dynamics. But
before first we have to summarize the market clearing conditions.
3.2.4 Market clearing conditions
Since physical capital is the only production factor which can be accumulated
asset market clearing implies
V (t) = K(t), ∀t. (3.25)
Labor and capital market clearing is given by
K(t) = KI(t) +
∫ M(t)
0
kidi+
∫ M(t)
0
kAi di, (3.26)
and
L = LB(t) + LN(t)
∫ M(t)
0
li(t)di, (3.27)
where ki(t) and li(t) denote capital and labor employed by monopolist i and
kAi is capital used for quality investments by monopolist i. Finally, goods
market clearing can be expressed as
SB(t)E(t) = PB(t)XB(t) (3.28)
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and
[1− SB(t)]E(t) = PN(t)XN(t). (3.29)
3.2.5 Dynamic equilibrium
We define a dynamic equilibrium as a path of prices and quantities which
fulfills household and firm optimization. We obtain the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3.1. There is an unique dynamic equilibrium path in
which household expenditures, the stock of physical capital and the wage rate
grow at identical, constant rate
gE(t) = gK(t) = gw(t) = A− ρ > 0, ∀t. (3.30)
The labor’s income share and the saving rate are constant and equal to
α(t) =
L
L+ Ξ
≡ α, ∀t. (3.31)
and
s(t) =
A− ρ
A
(1− α), ∀t. (3.32)
The investment good denominated interest rate is constant and equal to A.
Proof. The Euler equation, the asset market clearing condition, (3.24) and
the flow budget constraint imply
K˙(t) = A
[
1 +
L
Ξ
]
K(t)− E(0) exp [(A− ρ)t] . (3.33)
This differential equation has the following solution
K(t) = Z exp
[[
1 +
L
Ξ
]
At
]
+
E(0)
AL
Ξ
+ ρ
exp [(A− ρ)t] , (3.34)
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where Z is a constant to be determined. Substituting this into the transver-
sality condition gives
lim
t→∞
[
Z exp
[
AL
Ξ
t
]
+ exp [−ρt]
E(0)
AL
Ξ
+ ρ
]
= 0. (3.35)
since AL
Ξ
> 0 we must have Z = 0. This implies that K˙(t)
K(t)
= w˙(t)
w(t)
= E˙(t)
E(t)
=
A − ρ, ∀t, where the first equality comes from (3.24). The labor’s income
share is constant and given by (3.31) due to (3.24), too. The saving rate can
be rewritten as
s(t) =
AKI(t)
w(t)L+ AK(t)
=
KI(t)
K(t)
(1− α). (3.36)
Note that KI(t)
K(t)
= A−ρ
A
in order that the capital stock grows at the balanced
growth rate. Q.E.D.
It is remarkable that we can explicitly solve for the aggregate variables
along the dynamic equilibrium path. There is no transitional dynamic and
the economy’s aggregate behavior is fully disconnected from the evolution
of the sectoral variables. This is first due to the logarithmic intertemporal
preferences which imply that the saving rate is constant although the relative
price pB changes. Second it is due to (3.24) which guarantees that the factor
shares are constant no matter how things change at the sectoral level.
The evolution of the sectoral variables depends on the functional form of
S˜B(pB) and c(·). Because production of the non-progressive sector is linear
in labor the labor’s income share is unity in this sector, i.e. αN = 1. If we
spend one unit of money for output of the progressive sector a fraction of
αB(t) = 1− ǫ+ ǫ
2αvc(t), (3.37)
will be used for labor compensation, where αvc(t) is the labor’s share implied
by the variable cost (3.10).76
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Note that both w(t) and D(t) grow at constant rate A−ρ whereas r(t) is
constant over time. As a result, since ∆ > 1, w(t)
D(t)∆
declines relative to r(t).
Hence if (3.10) implies that labor and capital are gross complements, αvc(t)
is declining over time. This generates a picture which is consistent with the
empirical motivation (i.e. Figure 3.2 and 3.3) in the introduction.
3.3 Critical and concluding remarks
Section 3.2 provided a theoretical framework with a constant aggregate la-
bor’s income share generated by offsetting trends in value-added and factor
shares at a sectoral level. However, I have to acknowledge that this result de-
pends on several specific assumptions. In the following the key assumptions
are critically analyzed. The discussion is also aimed to summarize potential
challenges for future research.
The core piece of the theory is equation (3.23) which states that firms
have an incentive to change their level of sector specific quality investments
whenever the aggregate labor’s income share deviates from a constant α. In
order to get this result we had to overcome several issues. One challenge
is that in an environment of structural change a sector specific innovation
incentive changes due to changing market size. In this paper I solve this
issue by the specification of Aghion and Howitt (2005), section 5 (see (3.20)).
This implies that the innovation incentive is proportional to the wage rate
although the sectoral market shares change over time. Although Aghion and
Howitt’s (2005) specification is somewhat ad hoc it should be possible to
endogenize it by a so called “second generation growth model” where we
have both expanding variety as well as quality improvement.
Another critical assumption is the spillover term D(t) in (3.21) which has
to be proportional to K(t). However, with an endogenously expanding set of
product varieties – as suggested above – there might be a way to rationalize
this spillover.
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SUM UP TO A CONSTANT AGGREGATE LABOR’S INCOME SHARE?
A clearly very unsatisfactory element is the assumption of “perfect” spillover
in equation (3.21) such that only the relative quality level Ai(t)
A¯(t)
affects the
costs.77 Relaxing this assumption should definitely be the aim of future re-
search.
Other criticism might be that although the mechanization of the progres-
sive sector is emphasized in the introduction, the mechanization in the model
occurs only due to a spillover and is not driven by a specific incentive.
This leads us to the conclusion that the stylized model presented in Sec-
tion 3.2 is not the complete answer to everything. There are many directions
in which the theory can and should be improved. But hopefully, if this is
done, such a theory allows us to learn more about the essence of the aggregate
labor’s share than a theory which just assumes an aggregate Cobb-Douglas
production function with α = 0.623.
Notes
62. Note that the labor compensation calculations of the KLEMS takes the labor income of proprietors
into account – in contrast to the BEA data (see Krueger, 1999). This is done by assuming that, in a given
industry, the proprietor’s hourly compensation is the same as the average worker’s compensation. See also
Gollin (2002) for the importance of this adjustment.
63. With any constant return to scale production function and competitive factor rewards the labor’s
share can be written as 1 −
f ′(k)k
f(k)
where k is the capital stock per efficiency units of labor. Hence, in
order to have a stationary point in k, the labor’s share must be constant too (and vice versa).
64. Many even assume that the micro-level technology is linear in labor, while generating a constant
fraction of capital income via a constant mark-up.
65. Clearly, if all production factors can be accumulated and grow at identical rate, balanced growth
and constancy of factor shares can be reconciled. But such a theory would imply constant relative factor
prices between human and physical capital and no physical capital deepening, which is clearly at odds
with the data.
66. See footnote 3 of Acemoglu (2003) and the papers cited therein.
67. In Jones’ (2005) model, at each point in time there exists a number of independent draws of a
capital and labor requirement. The production possibilities in a point in time are then the hull of all
drawn combinations of input requirements. It is shown that if the input coefficients are drawn from two
independent Pareto distributions the hull converges to a Cobb-Douglas technology (as the number of
draws goes to infinity).
68. Other papers may refer to the first two sectors as the “good” and the “service” sector. But since
the first sector is associated with a relatively high total factor productivity (TFP) growth and consequently
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CH. 3: HOW DOES MECHANIZATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
declining prices relative to the aggregate price index I prefer the labels “progressive”/“non-progressive”
(which go back to Baumol, 1967).
69. Many papers document a declining labor’s income share in the manufacturing sector (see e.g.
Bo¨ckerman and Maliranta, 2012). Some papers relate this decline to foreign trade competition. In this
paper however, we will focus on a closed economy and explain the dynamics by technical change. In fact,
the decline in Figure 3.2 is very monotonic over the last 50 years and does not seem to accelerate with
globalization. And Figure C.1 in the Appendix illustrates that a declining labor’s share in the progressive
sector is a pattern we can observe in many countries.
70. By definition we have
∑
j=B,N,U Sj(t) = 1.
71. The two counteracting forces are quantitatively important. The mean value-added share of the
progressive sector is 0.32 and the progressive sector’s labor share declines in the 47 years by about 16
percentage points. Hence abstracting from the counteracting structural change the aggregate labor’s
share would decline by over 5 percentage points in the observed period.
72. This is a big contrast to the existing literature about structural change. All papers of structural
change with a constant aggregate labor’s share I am aware of generate the constancy by identical and
constant labor’s shares across sectors. For structural change in terms of value-added, Figure 3.2 clearly
rejects this assumption. Moreover, note that in order to get a constant aggregate labor’s share with struc-
tural change we need mechanization. With structural change and (constant) capital intensity differences
across sectors as in Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) aggregate factor share constancy is not possible.
73. In general factor intensity reversal can occur if we have two sectors with different elasticities of
substitution.
74. Note that in contrast to Aghion and Howitt (2005), where the scale effect is generated by popu-
lation growth changing market size arises in this model due to structural change (i.e. changes in SB(t)).
75. Note that firms make in equilibrium zero profits, such that there is no value of firm ownership.
76. Note that (3.9) is a Cobb-Douglas defined over a CES aggregate and labor, where 1 − ǫ is the
weight on labor. Hence a fraction 1 − ǫ is directly used for labor compensation. The other fraction ǫ is
used to cover the variable and fixed costs. Fixed cost are entirely used for capital compensation, whereas
a fraction αvc(t) of the variable costs goes to the workers. Because of the constant mark-up the weights
of variable and fixed cost are given by ǫ and 1− ǫ, respectively.
77. This assumption somewhat resembles the one of “perfect state dependence” of the knowledge
accumulation in Acemoglu (2003).
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